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POLITICAL TRIALS IN DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
ERIC A. POSNER†
ABSTRACT
Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions
normally ensure that citizens cannot be tried and punished for
political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere with criminal
convictions of terrorists and others who pose a nonimmediate but real
threat to public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use
various subterfuges to avoid constitutional protections—often with the
complicity of judges—but when they do so, they risk losing the
confidence of the public, which may believe that the government
targets legitimate political opponents. This Article argues that the
amount of process enjoyed by defendants in criminal trials reflects a
balancing of two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand, and
the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other. Political trials
are those in which the defendant’s opposition to the existing
government or the constitutional order is the main issue. The Article
discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust
process protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the
risks to political competition are minimized. International trials are
also discussed within this framework.
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INTRODUCTION
A political trial is a trial whose disposition—that is, usually, a
finding of guilt or innocence, followed by punishment or acquittal, of
an individual—depends on an evaluation of the defendant’s political
attitudes and activities. In the typical political trial, a person is tried
for engaging in political opposition or violating a law against political
dissent, or for violating a broad and generally applicable law that is
not usually enforced, enforced strictly, or enforced with a strict
punishment, except against political opponents of the state or the
government.
Political trials are uncommon in liberal democracies but not
unknown. In the United States, political trials were conducted in the
late eighteenth century, when Jeffersonians were convicted of
violating the Sedition Act. Ma ny people believe that trials for sedition
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during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War
were political trials. And, some have argued that military trials of
suspected terrorists after September 11 will be political trials.
These political trials bear a family resemblance to trials of
deposed leaders of enemy states, including the first Nuremberg trial
of Nazi war criminals, the Tokyo trial of Japanese war criminals, the
trials of Slobodan Milosevic and other officials of the successor states
of Yugoslavia, and the trials of perpetrators of the Rwandan
genocide. These trials have all been political trials, although
burnished with legalisms: the defendants were charged with legal
violations but prosecuted because they were political enemie s of the
states that operate the tribunals. The legal foundation of the trials is
either explicitly retroactive or based on very general international
laws or principles that are selectively applied against defeated or
compliant states. Although recent efforts to establish legal
foundations for the trials of war criminals and dictators have resulted
in the creation of the International Criminal Court, American
opposition to this court ensures that in the near future such trials will
continue to be political, rather than legal, institutions.1
Another related group of trials occurs in transitional settings, in
which a democratic system succeeds an authoritarian system. These
trials are not international because they take place within a single
state and involve only the nationals of that state, but they are not
ordinary domestic trials either because they straddle constitutional
regimes, raising special problems of retroactivity. Transitional trials
occurred or were seriously considered in, among other places, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany in the 1990s; Argentina,
Uruguay, and Chile in the 1980s; Greece and Portugal in the 1970s;
and France and other occupied countries after World War II. These
trials were political because the defendants were tried for their
participation in a despised government, not for any legal violations
for which they could have been convicted under the old regime.2

1. See generally FROM N UREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Philippe Sands ed., 2003). The Nure mberg trials—and especially the first
trial of major war criminals—are the subject of a large literature. See generally R OBERT E.
CONOT, JUSTICE AT N UREMBERG (1983); JOSEPH E. PERSICO, N UREMBERG: INFAMY ON
TRIAL (1994); ANN TUSA & JON TUSA, THE N UREMBERG TRIAL (1983).
2. Accounts of many of these trials are collected in 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Neil J.
Kritz ed., 1995).
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Political trials of all types are heavily criticized, but some are
more heavily criticized than others. Political trials in authoritarian
regimes are objectionable, of course, but no more objectionable than
authoritarianism itself. Political trials in transitional settings are
understandable, if sometimes regrettable. Because these trials are
retroactive, they violate the rule of law, and to violate the rule of law
during a transition to the rule of law seems unfortunate, even
paradoxical. Still, some observers defend political trials in the
transitional setting as a way of teaching the public a lesson about the
evils of the old regime. Political trials in the international setting are
open to the charge of victor’s justice, but are often seen as expedients
necessary to provide the foundation for an international criminal
legal system. This was a common defense of the Nuremberg trial.3
Political trials in liberal democracies, however, have virtually no
defenders; they are reviled as a corruption of the judicial process and
a betrayal of liberal principles. The standard view in the legal
literature holds that (1) governments have strong incentives to limit
process and attack their opponents; (2) judges are the guardians of
due process rights, as well as of political rights such as free speech; (3)
during times of emergency, governments exploit public fears to crack
down on dissent; (4) judges should and do stand in the government’s
way; and (5) when they do not, it is regrettable.4 The defect in this
theory is the absence of a plausible account of the motivations of the
actors. Why would judges try to restrain the government, and why
would a government bent on political domination allow itself to be
restrained by judges? History shows that judges often enthusiastically

3. See, e.g., JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 155–70
(1964).
4. See generally, e.g., MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH
ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977); THE CONSTITUTION
IN WARTIME (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); VICTOR S. N AVASKY, NAMING N AMES (2003); H.C.
PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR 1917–1918 (1986); SHKLAR, supra note 3;
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956); PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT “R ED MENACE”:
UNITED STATES PROSECUTIONS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS , 1947–52 (1984); GEOFFREY
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004). Hannah Arendt’s criticisms of the
Eichmann trial reflect the conventional wisdom about political trials, though she was apparently
not opposed to a different kind of political trial, that is, one conducted by an international
tribunal rather than in an Israeli court. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 269
(1994) (arguing that charges against Eichmann were crimes against humanity that should have
been heard by an international court). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991), although Amar emphasizes the role of the jury.
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facilitate political prosecutions and that governments are perfectly
capable of ignoring judges who do not.5
The thesis of this Article is that political trials in liberal
democracies reflect an unsurprising balancing process at work. In an
ordinary criminal trial, established procedures reflect a balance
between liberty and security that is suitable for normal times. Due
process protections force governments to prove that the defendant is
dangerous to the public, and not simply a political opponent or
someone whose conviction would be politically convenient for the
government. Governments acquiesce in generous due process
protections in the hope of showing that they can survive legitimate
political competition: if they do not need to suppress critics, then they
must have confidence in their policies.
But during emergencies and times of heightened tension, the
balance changes. The public demands security, and the government
can supply it only by detaining and even convicting people without
strong evidence that they have committed serious crimes.6 These
people are targeted because of the harm they threaten, not because of
harm they have done, so ordinary due process standards would
prevent their conviction. To address these threats, governments press
courts to tolerate reductions in process, and courts generally (but not
always) comply. Although at the same time the reduction in process
creates the danger that the government will target people who are
effective critics or political opponents rather than threats to public
safety, this risk to political competition is tolerated by the public
when the security threat is sufficiently high.
Thus, what is distinctive about a political trial is that the libertysecurity trade-off that is only implicit in the due process standards of

5. I will discuss many examples of the first in Part III.C, infra; Lincoln’s refusal to obey
Justice Taney’s order in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.D. Md. 1861), is the preeminent
American example of the second.
6. Thus, this Article can be placed with recent work discussing how the president’s powers
should (or should not) change during emergences. Compare Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules:
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? , 112 Y ALE L.J. 1011, 1023–24
(2003) (arguing that the president should act la wlessly and then seek public ratification), with
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030–32 (2004) (advocating
a statutory scheme that would grant the president special powers during an emergency). My
more modest point is that any time security concerns are heightened (whether or not there is a
true “emergency”), process protections will be relaxed, and this relaxation can be done in a
manner that is consistent with basic liberal, democratic principles, as long as one pays attention
to the difference between suspects who are public threats and suspects who are mainstream
political opponents.
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ordinary trials is brought out into the open. The government cries
“security!” The defendant cries “liberty!” The judge and the public
make a political judgment about how this trade-off should be
adjusted, if at all, in light of the real or purported emergency.
This argument has normative implications, which can again be
contrasted to those of the standard view. The normative implication
of the conventional wisdom is that judges should enforce political and
process rights during emergencies more vigorously than they
ordinarily do. Political trials are simply never justified, and judges
should do all they can to prevent them from occurring.7
The normative implication of my thesis is that political trials are
unavoidable and must be tolerated, although they can be better
designed and managed than they often are.8 Due process in a political
trial ba lances the credibility of the prosecuting authorities with
national security. In a nonpolitical trial, process has the main purpose
of minimizing error and administrative cost. In a political trial,
process has the additional purpose of maintaining the credibility of
the government or (what is the same thing) of allowing the conviction
of people who are public threats while preventing the conviction of
people who are mere partisan political opponents. Because the
credibility of the government is an issue, certain steps should be taken
to enhance the government’s credibility, and in the process to reduce
the risk that the trial is being used for partisan purposes. These steps
include involving judges and jurors from opposition parties and
allowing defendants to mount political defenses.

7. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 4, at 542–50.
8. My approach is thus to treat liberal principles—like legalism and the rule of law—as
instrumental rather than ideological; this is in the spirit of Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule
of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE R ULE OF LAW 19 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski
eds., 2003), and Adam Przeworski, Why Do Political Parties Obey the Results of Elections? , in
DEMOCRACY AND THE R ULE OF LAW, supra, at 114. The approach is to ask why the people
with power—the wealthy, the well born, those with guns—would be willing to commit
themselves to the rule of law (Holmes), elections (Przeworski), and other liberal democratic
principles. The answer is assumed to be that it lies in their self-interest, not in the “inherently
binding power of norms” or “legitimacy.” Holmes, supra, at 24; see also Barry Weingast, The
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI . R EV. 245 (1997)
(presenting a model of politics in which the government exercises self-restraint to avoid
sanctions from opposition groups). For a related approach by a legal scholar, see Daniel A.
Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002) (arguing that when states make
constitutional commitments to protect human rights, and grant the judiciary independence to
enforce them, they signal that they have a long time horizon, and therefore are unlikely to
expropriate investments).

02_POSNER.DOC

2005]

2/6/2006 4:01 PM

POLITICAL TRIALS

81

On this view, there is no normative objection to a political trial
per se. Such objections arise only to political trials that target partisan
opponents rather than public threats, and to political trials that target
public threats but that also erode public confidence in government to
such an extent as to interfere with normal governance.
I will not focus on current controversies, including the use of
military commissions to try suspected al Qaeda and Taliban members
for war crimes, the use of administrative procedures to identify
enemy combatants prior to their indefinite detention, the enhanced
use of deportation procedures against aliens suspected of ties with al
Qaeda, and the criminal trials of people suspected of terrorist activity,
such as Zacarias Moussaoui. But these practices may become easier
to understand in light of historical practices, and I will briefly discuss
a few of them at the end of this Article.
Part I provides the historical, legal, and academic background to
the political trial. Part II explains why rational governments in liberal
democratic systems will sometimes conduct political trials. Part III
discusses ways in which these trials can be designed and managed so
as not to undermine the principle of political competition at the heart
of liberal democracy. Part IV extends this discussion to related trials,
including trials of enemy combatants, transitional trials, and
international criminal trials.
I. HISTORICAL, ACADEMIC, AND LEGAL
BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL TRIALS
A. Historical Background
In the classic domestic political trial, the defendant is tried for
opposing the government or ruling class. The political trial need not
be based on retroactive lawmaking, though it often is. There may be
an existing law that prohibits opposition to the government; if so, the
defendant may be tried under that law and convicted. Such a trial is
political, even though all process rules may be observed, because the
defendant’s guilt or innocence depends on the defendant’s political
beliefs or activities. The reason that political trials are often
retroactive, either in form or in fact, is that generally applicable laws
forbidding political opposition are highly unpopular and frequently
unworkable. A general prohibition of criticism of the government is
draconian in all but the most authoritarian states. Governments
depend on criticism and, even when they do not, they are usually too
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weak to outlaw it. In democracies, legislators shy from laws
prohibiting political opposition because the legislators know that
these laws can be used against them if their party loses power. Even
when the majority favors such laws, opposition parties may have
enough strength in the legislature or other institutions, such as the
judiciary, to prevent the majority party from passing laws that have
force.
For these reasons, governments that seek to harass or eliminate
political opponents through the judicial process usually resort to
generally applicable laws against subversion, conspiracy, disorderly
conduct, incitement to violate the laws, and so forth. However, they
enforce them only against people who pose a genuine threat to their
power or to public security, not against mainstream political rivals or
ordinary citizens blowing off steam.
The domestic political trial can be located on a spectrum that
extends from the summary execution or detention at one end to the
procedurally correct trial at the other end. At one extreme, the
government identifies and then captures or kills its opponents without
informing them of the charges, giving them a chance to defend
themselves, or involving independent agents such as judges. As one
moves along the spectrum, one adds procedural protections: general,
public, prospective substantive rules; the right to a trial; lawyers;
judges; rules of evidence; rights to cross-examine; jurors; and so forth.
Military trials and deportation hearings fall at the midpoint of the
spectrum; the ordinary criminal trial at the other end. As process
increases, the government loses its power to disable its political
opponents, but it gains something as well: the ability to claim credibly
that its prosecutions serve the public interest rather than (solely) the
government’s interest in its own survival. Part II describes the logic of
this theory in more detail.
As noted in the Introduction, not all political trials are domestic.
Many are international, and others are transitional. Table 1 provides
some historical examples of each type; the regular domestic trials are
drawn from American history. Note that the classification of many of
these cases as “political trials” is controversial, and I include them
only because they recur in the literature.9
9. In particular, the Hiss trial does not seem political. Hiss was prosecuted for committing
perjury, and his trials (the first ended in deadlock) seem to have been fair. See ALLEN
WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE 412–502 (1978) (describing the trials). The
same is true for the Sacco and Vanzetti trial and the trial of the Rosenbergs. But many people
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TABLE 1. POLITICAL TRIALS10
Panel A. International
Year

Name

Result

1945

Nuremberg Tribunal

19 convictions (12 executions);
3 acquittals

19461948

Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal

25 convictions (7 executions)

1993present

International Criminal Tribunal
for the FormerYugoslavia

30 convictions; 2 acquittals
(through 2003)

Panel B. Transitional
Year

Name

Result

1649

Charles I

Execution

1780s

American Revolution: trials of
Loyalists

Various

1792

French Revolution: trial of
Louis XVI

Execution

1944

French trials of Nazi collaborators

Various

1974

Greek trials of former government
officials

Convictions

1989

German trials of border guards
and former leaders

Convictions and acquittals

regarded these trials as political at the time because the defendants had radical political views,
and they assumed that the government had trumped up charges to weaken political opposition.
See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND
EISENHOWER 61 (1978) (describing the public reaction to Hiss: “obviously guilty not only to
conservatives but also to Cold War liberals, obviously innocent, the victim of a frame-up, to
almost all who deplored the purge”).
10. For international tribunals, see generally R ICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR’S JUSTICE:
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 31 (2001) (Tokyo); TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 504
(Nuremberg); James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the Law?, 47 J. CONFLICT R ESOL. 140, 154
(2003) (Yugoslavia tribunal). For transitions, see generally 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra
note 2; MICHAEL WALZER, R EGICIDE AND R EVOLUTION (1974). For American domestic trials,
see generally AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994); POLITICAL TRIALS
IN HISTORY: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE P RESENT (Ron Christenson ed., 1991). On Sedition Act
trials, see generally SMITH, supra note 4. On Civil War trials, see generally J.G. RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951). On World War I–era trials, see
generally PETERSON & FITE, supra note 4. On Smith Act trials, see generally STEINBERG, supra
note 4. On the Haymarket trial, see generally PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY
(1984); JOHN F. BANNAN & R OSEMARY S. BANNAN, LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM: THE
PEACE MILITANTS AND THE COURTS (1974). Other sources are cited infra .
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Panel C. Domestic (United States)
Year

Name

Charge11

Result

17981801

Matthew Lyon and
other prominent
Republicans
Impeachment of
Samuel Chase

Violation of Sedition
Act

Convictions in nearly
every case

Misconduct

Acquittal

1807

Aaron Burr

Treason

Acquittal

1863

Clement
Vallandigham and
other Southern
sympathizers

Violation of martial
law

Conviction by military
commission;
detention and exile

1868

Impeachment of
Andrew Johnson

Violation of Tenure of Acquittal
Office Act

1886

Haymarket riot

Conspiracy to commit
murder, riot

Conviction of eight
defendants;
execution of four;
three were jailed,
then pardoned

1918

Eugene Debs and
other opponents of
American
involvement in
World War I

Sedition

Convictions; some
sentences later
commuted

1918

Industrial Workers of
the World (multiple
trials)

Conspiracy to obstruct Mainly convictions
World War I

1919

Jacob Abrams and
other anarchists

Sedition

Four convictions; exile

1921

Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo
Vanzetti

Murder

Conviction, execution

1923

Marcus Garvey

Mail fraud

Conviction,
deportation

1944

Elizabeth Dilling and
other Nazi
sympathizers

Smith Act violations

Mistrial, then
dismissal

1949

Eugene Dennis and
other Communists

Smith Act violations

Convictions

1805

11.

When multiple charges were made, the main charge or a representative charge is listed.
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Panel C (continued)
Year

Name

Charge

Result

1949

Alger Hiss

Perjury

Conviction

1950

Hollywood 10

Contempt of Congress

Convictions

1951

Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg

Espionage

Convictions,
executions

1968

Catonsville 9

Destruction of
government
property

Convictions

1968

Boston 5

Conspiracy to obstruct Convictions, reversed
draft
on appeal

1969

Chicago 8

Incitement to riot

Some convictions,
reversed on appeal

1974

Wounded Knee

Various offenses
related to
occupation of town

Case dismissed after
trial

19891990

Oliver North and
William Poindexter

Defrauding the
government

Convictions; North's
was overturned on
appeal; Poindexter
was pardoned

1999

Impeachment of Bill
Clinton

Perjury and
obstruction of
justice

Acquittal

There have been few international political trials of leaders or
major officials.12 For an international criminal trial to occur, a state
must deliver up leaders for prosecution by another state or else suffer
a decisive military defeat. But no state willingly yields its leaders, and
throughout most of history victorious states saw no value in
conducting trials of the leaders of vanquished states. Before the
modern era, leaders were executed, imprisoned, exiled, or welcomed
as guest-hostages. Tamerlane displayed Bayezid I in a cage after
defeating him in the battle of Ankara in 1402. The Thirty Years War
ended in 1648 with a settlement, and no leaders were tried or
punished. Napoleon ended his days on the island of St. Helena. The
War of 1812, the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the

12. Excluded are ordinary military trials of captured enemy soldiers or noncombatants who
have committed war crimes. In some ways, these are political trials, but in the main they are not:
they are based on laws for which there is an international consensus.
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Russo-Japanese War all ended in political settlements. Germany was
decisively defeated in World War I, but the desultory efforts to
prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm collapsed when Holland refused to
extradite him. Britain abandoned its efforts to prosecute Ottoman
war criminals because it could not maintain control over Turkish
territory.13
The pattern continued after World War II. Most wars ended in a
political settlement or suspension of hostilities that failed to provide
for trials; these wars included the conflicts between Pakistan and
India and between Israel and Arab states, the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, the war between Britain and Argentina over the
Falkland Islands, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the first Gulf War. The
U.S. prosecuted Manuel Noriega for drug crimes after it ousted him
from the helm of Panama, but this was a far cry from Nuremberg. The
U.S. has no interest in prosecuting Saddam Hussein, preferring to
leave him to the Iraqis, albeit with substantial U.S. assistance and
influence.14 It is ironic that Nuremberg brought respectability to the
political trial, as it has had virtually no value as a precedent for trying
leaders of a state that has started wars, or for holding international
trials of war criminals.15 Only the Yugoslavia conflict, fifty years later,
resulted in major war crimes trials before an international tribunal.16
Trials in transitional regimes, by contrast, have been common;
Panel B lists just a few of the dozens that have occurred. The
13. GARY BASS , STAY THE HAND OF V ENGEANCE 106–46 (2001).
14. The statute authorizing the trial passed only with the approval of the U.S., and the U.S.
has sent a team of attorneys to participate in the preparation of the trial. See Neil A. Lewis &
David Johnston, The Struggle for Iraq: War Crimes; U.S. Team Is Sent to Develop Case in
Hussein Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at 1.
15. Professor Martha Minow argues that Nuremberg inspired the trials of Adolf Eichmann
in Israel, Argentina’s prosecution of members of its military, Germany’s border guard trials, and
the trial of Jaruzelski in Poland, but, as she also notes, this claim is in tension with “the
enormous gap in time between the Nuremberg trials and any comparable effort to prosecute
war crimes in international settings.” MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN V ENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 27 (1998). See also
the valuable discussion of Argentina’s experience in CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL
ON TRIAL (1996), which notes the relationship between the Nuremberg trial and the trial of
Argentine leaders. Whatever the truth about Nuremberg, I have found no support in the
historical literature for Professor Minow’s claim that the Tokyo tribunal has had similar positive
influence. MINOW, supra, at 27. Most accounts of it are decidedly negative, e.g., the cha pters in
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (C. Hosoya et al. eds.,
1986), especially B.V.A. Röling’s lucid Introduction, in id., at 15. See also the historical accounts
cited elsewhere.
16. There are a few other ambiguous cases, including the Rwanda and Sierra Leone
tribunals.
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transitional or successor trial is intended to punish members of the
old regime —to do substantial justice—and to persuade the public that
the old regime was evil so that the new regime will be seen as a
legitimate replacement.
The most common type of political trial is that which occurs
within a regime. Panel C is confined to the American experience, but
it is important to remember that political trials are more common in
authoritarian regimes than in liberal democracies because opposition
to the government is usually illegal. Britain, France, and the other
established democracies also have a long history of political trials.
American political trials (or trials that are arguably political even if
not obviously so) have occurred most often during times of upheaval:
during the founding era, the Civil War, World War I, World War II,
the height of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the
Vietnam War.
Many political trials are clearly identifiable as such because they
involve laws that target people for their political views or the peaceful
expression of those views. But because “political trial” is an epithet, it
has been applied to a broad range of questionable judicial practices
and controversies that have little in common, and, as a result, the
term is hard to define. However, the core meaning is relatively clear.17
On this definition, a political trial occurs when the government uses
the judicial process against its opponents (including foreign enemies
and internal dissidents) who have not violated formal, generally
enforced laws or who have violated only formal laws against political
dissent. This can happen when a formal law prohibits opposition to
the government or the constitutional order that the government
protects, in which case the normal judicia l process rules can be
respected, or when charges are trumped up, and the defendant is
convicted of violating laws that have been not been violated or that
are very general and not enforced against people unless they are
critics of the government. In the latter case, the conviction must occur

17. I exclude trials that involve controversial laws or defenses, like the battered-spouse
defense, which have political resonance, and trials in which the government trie s to enforce a
generally applicable law (say, against murder) but the jury nullifies the law and acquits a guilty
defendant for political reasons. In so doing, the jury is licensing the murder of its political
opponents. See, e.g., DALLIN H. OAKS & MARVIN S. HULL, CARTHAGE CONSPIRACY: THE
TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED ASSASSINS OF JOSEPH SMITH 184–86 (1975) (describing the acquittal
of Smith’s murderers by a jury consisting of anti-Mormon citizens). However objectionable, this
is not a problem of the government trying to maintain its power by eliminating its political
opponents and is thus outside the scope of this paper.
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with the complicity of the judge or the jury, or both; normal process
protections are relaxed.18 Political opponents, as used here, include
leaders and civilians of hostile foreign states as well as domestic
partisans.19
B. Literature
Most Americans prize their country’s tradition of tolerance for
political dissent, and the political trial would appear to have no place
in such a tradition. Political trials are associated with various unjust or
dubious events: trials of draft resisters and government critics during
the Vietnam War, of harmless eccentrics or well-meaning dissenters
during the Cold War, of labor organizers and peace activists during
World War I. To say that a trial is political is always to condemn it.
The mainstream literature on these events accepts this popular view.20
However, there has always been a counterpoint in the literature,
stimulated by a signal event in the history of the political trial: the
Nuremberg trial of major war criminals after World War II. Many
commentators have been unable to allow their reservations about
“normal” political trials to apply to Nuremberg, when a political trial
seemed preferable to the alternatives—the release of the Nazi leaders
on the ground that they violated no international law, or their
summary execution on the ground that they were evil men and had
lost the war. Thus, there is a tension: if the political trial at
Nuremberg was desirable, then one must abandon the popular view
that all political trials are objectionable. But if not all political trials

18. For a discussion of the complex relationship between political trials and trials used to
determine whether a person is an enemy combatant, see infra Part IV.A.
19. My definition falls between the two extremes in the literature. Professor Otto
Kirchheimer limits political trials to trials that have partisan motivations. OTTO K IRCHHEIMER,
POLITICAL JUSTICE 49 (1967). Professor Michal Belknap, on the other hand, includes the trial
that
is intended to affect the structure, personnel, or policies of government, that is the
product of or has its outcome determined by political controversy, or that results from
the efforts of a group within society having control of the machinery of government to
use the courts to disadvantage its rivals in a power struggle which is not itself
immediately political or to preserve its own economic or social position.
Michal R. Belknap, Introduction, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, supra note 10, at xvi. This
definition would require classifying almost any trial as political. The definition I use excludes
trials (fairly) based on laws that derive from the constitutional bargain. Of course, if one thinks
of the constitutional bargain as itself “political,” then all trials are political, but then one cannot
make a useful distinction between routine criminal trials and the kind of troublesome trials that
dominate the literature.
20. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
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are objectionable, what are the grounds for condemning the trials of
dissenters in the United States?
This tension permeates Professor Judith Shklar’s prominent
discussion of the Nuremberg trial.21 Shklar defends the trial on the
ground that it promoted the rule of law by applying the forms of
legality to a novel set of circumstances. It was, in essence, a theatrical
act of legislation. The trial also served valuable political ends by
helping to discredit Nazism in Germany and to awaken Germany’s
dormant legal traditions.22 These arguments are in the service of
Shklar’s main thesis, a critique of “legalism”—the ideology under
which the rule of law becomes an end in itself rather than a means to
the accomplishment of liberal values—and the legalistic view that all
political trials are objectionable because they violate legal norms.23
However, Professor Shklar flatly denies that domestic political
trials can have a valuable role in a liberal constitutional order.24
Consider her analysis of Judge Hand’s opinion for the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Dennis.25 Rejecting the
defendants’ First Amendment challenge to their convictions under
the Smith Act, which prohibited adv ocacy of destruction of the
American government by force, Judge Hand argued that Justice
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test of the First Amendment
was too narrow; Congress ought to have the power to address future
21. See SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 170–79.
22. By contrast, she views the Tokyo trial as a “dud,” because, in her view, Japanese
traditions and culture were not receptive to Western style legalism, id. at 181, and the Japanese
simply did not behave as badly as the Germans—no crimes against humanity, only war crimes
and crimes of aggre ssion—and thus could portray themselves as moral equivalents of the
victors. The first point is simplistic: Japanese ethical traditions differ in complex ways from
Western ethical traditions, but if her claim is that the Japanese were less likely to condemn the
behavior of fellow citizens than the behavior of foreigners, this feature of their moral system
would hardly distinguish them from the Germans or the Americans.
23. Id. at 156; see also Bernard D. Meltzer, “War Crimes”: The Nuremberg Trial and the
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia , 30 VAL. U. L. R EV. 895, 907 (1996) (describing how the
Nuremberg trial provided closure after World War II by satisfying people’s desire for judgment,
limiting vigilante justice, and reintegrating Germany into the rest of Europe). Professor Shklar’s
arguments would be echoed in Professor Michael Walzer’s defense of the trials of Charles I and
Louis XVI, which, by symbolizing the end of monarchy, performed a valuable political function,
the ushering in of democracy. See WALZER, supra note 10, at 5–6. For a contrasting view, see
MINEAR , supra note 10, who attacks the Tokyo war crimes tribunal for violating the norms of
legality. His view appears to be that enemy leaders should not be tried if they are “sincere
men”; if they are not, summary execution would be appropriate. Id. at 179–80. He appears to
condemn Nuremberg as well. Id. at 169.
24. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 220.
25. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
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dangers that are probable but not too remote.26 At the height of the
Cold War, Judge Hand believed that international (that is, Sovietdirected) Communism posed just such a danger, and for that reason
the conviction of the Dennis defendants was justified.27
Professor Shklar disagrees. Citing Justice Jackson’s opinion on
appeal, she argues that the political trial corrupts the judiciary:
The judicial process, Justice Jackson observed, is not designed to
deal with radical political movements. It deals with individual
offenders against law, not with the elimination of political groups.
To attempt such tasks is to injure the judicial process, because the
principle of legality cannot survive them. 28

This is an argument by definition: because the judicial process is
designed to enforce the law, it cannot be used to eliminate political
enemies. But why not? Why can’t it do both? Indeed, Justice Jackson
concurred with the majority’s affirmance of Judge Hand’s decision,
apparently because he believed that the challenge posed by
Communism could be cabined as an international threat: judicial
persecution of Communists would not necessarily result in judicial
persecution of legitimate, indigenous opposition groups.29
The quotation above makes it appear that Professor Shklar
thinks that courts can convict people only for past acts and not on the
basis of future threats, but she backs off from that position, which
would be in tension with her critique of the legalist mentality, and
instead argues that Judge Hand was wrong about the facts. The threat
posed by American Communists was remote, not probable; therefore,
it was wrong to imprison them. 30
If the mobilization of the judiciary were a necessary muting of law in
time of war one would not complain, especially if this war, like those
in the past, had a foreseeable end. However, the Cold War is not
26. Id. at 212.
27. Id. at 213.
28. See SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 217.
29. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(explaining that a “rule of reason” will distinguish between a “danger of substantive evil or a
harmless letting off of steam”). That Communists ought to be granted a lower level of process
was apparently a general view of the Supreme Court. See William M. Wiecek, The Legal
Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001
SUP. CT. R EV. 375, 377. This was also the view of President Harry Truman, who “was willing, as
were some other liberals, to destroy the CPUSA in order to maintain basic liberties of all other
citizens.” STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 289.
30. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 215.
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like that, nor does it require the abandonment of the principle of
legality. This abandonment is a necessity conjured up by an
abandonment of pragmatic liberalism and a paranoia created by an
interminable, frustrating, and exhausting conflict. 31

Shklar thus adopts a legalistic solution to the problem of political
trials: acceptable during wars with a foreseeable end, and not
otherwise. This position is inconsistent with her critique of legalistic
thinking. She ought to approve or disapprove of political trials just to
the extent that they promote liberal values such as tolerance. Such
liberal values, she concedes, can be promoted only in a society that is
secure against external and internal threats.32 It follows that a political
trial that improves security (such as at time of war, but not only then)
may be justified. She disagrees with Judge Hand about the nature of
the threat posed by the American Communist Party; it is only this
disagreement about the facts, and not a philosophical or analytical
demonstration that the political trial during times of peace is
inconsistent with liberal values, that drives her critique of Dennis.33
Indeed, one could argue that the Dennis case was less a political
trial than the Nuremberg case. As I will discuss below, the promoters
of the Nuremberg trial sought to persuade the world of the evils of
the Nazi system and the virtues of the allied states that opposed it. By
contrast, the Dennis trial was motivated less by partisan goals than by
the belief that the American Communist Party was providing
assistance to a dangerous foreign enemy.
Subsequent writings of political theorists have not departed
much from Shklar’s conclusions.34 Professors Charles Abel and Frank

31. Id. at 219.
32. Id. at 210.
33. History has been kinder to Judge Hand than to Professor Shklar. The disclosure of the
Venona cables and the opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s revealed that the CPUSA was
dominated by the Soviet Union and used for espionage purposes, although by the end of World
War II the effectiveness of the Sovie t espionage network in the United States had been
undermined by defections, counterintelligence, and purges. HARVEY K LEHR ET AL., THE
SOVIET WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 4–5 (1998); ALLEN WEINSTEIN & ALEXANDER
V ASSILIEV, THE HAUNTED WOOD 339–44 (1999).
34. Otto Kirchheimer’s exhaustive book on political trials, POLITICAL JUSTICE, supra note
19, is mainly descriptive and analytical—he categorizes political trials, shows how they work,
illustrates the tensions, and so forth. His few normative comments seem to reflect ambivalence,
but the main tone is one of distaste. In this way, he anticipates Shklar, though he does not draw
her dogmatic line around political trials in liberal democracies. Others have defended political
trials in transitional settings. See, e.g., BASS, supra note 13, at 310 (arguing that war crimes
tribunals may prevent victims from taking justice into their own hands); WALZER, supra note
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Marsh argue that political trials may generate good political
outcomes—the Supreme Court’s contraction of libel law and
expansion of rights of criminal defendants are among their
examples—but they define the political trial so broadly as to
encompass virtually any case in which the court’s political views may
play a role in the decision, hence virtually all constitutional cases
decided by the Supreme Court.35 In doing so, they lose sight of the
classic trial against political dissent, which is the source of so much
discomfort and which they do not seem to defend. Professor Ron
Christenson argues that a political trial brings “social contradictions”
out in the open, where they can be discussed and acknowledged—but,
whatever one thinks of this theory, it is hardly a reason for a
government to conduct a political trial when it otherwise would have
no such inclination. 36
The political science literature is valuable but excessively general
for my purposes. My concern is with how government can lower
process protections when justified by security concerns without
generating suspicions that it is targeting its political opponents. This is
a question of legal and institutional design.37

10, at 86–89 (approving of the trials of Charles I and Louis XVI for establishing a symbolic
break with monarchy).
35. See generally CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL
TRIALS (1994).
36. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10.
37. The legal literature is also mostly unrelated to the arguments in this Article. The post–
World War II debates about positivism were inspired by political trials, such as the famous
postwar prosecution of a woman who informed on her husband under Nazi rule in order to get
rid of him. However, this political trial was the vehicle for investigating the concept of law, and
the chief figures in the debate—Hart and Fuller—did not discuss how political trials should be
conducted. Oddly, they both appear to have thought that the trial would be morally justified,
with the main difference being that Hart thought Germany should pass an ex post facto law
before prosecuting the woman whereas Fuller thought that the courts should declare Nazi law
void and enforce the law that existed at the time of the Weimar Republic. Compare H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. R EV. 593, 618–21 (1958),
with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV . L.
R EV. 630, 659–60 (1958). It is doubtful that their jurisprudential disagreements could explain
this disagreement about means.
Another literature focuses on the choices faced by transitional governments. See
generally, e.g., MINOW, supra note 15; CLAUS OFFE, VARIETIES OF TRANSITION: THE EAST
EUROPEAN AND EAST GERMAN EXPERIENCE (1996); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY,
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997); R UTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. R EV.
762 (2003). I will address some of the arguments in this literature in Part IV.
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C. Legal Background
Political trials need not violate domestic or international law.38
Consider U.S. law. The U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes one
type of political trial—the impeachment. Although Article 2, Section
4 says that the president and other civil officers may be impeached for
“high crimes and misdemeanors,”39 and one could argue that this
means that they can be impeached only for criminal viola tions, the
general view is that impeachment may be based on political
expediency.40 The articles of impeachment of both Presidents Andrew
Johnson and Bill Clinton included political as well as legal claims.41
And many impeachments of judges have been based on political
charges, such as that of undermining public confidence in the court.42
The U.S. Constitution does not ban political trials of other public
officials, nor does it say that such political trials can occur only
through impeachment proceedings. It also does not ban political trials
of ordinary citizens. A number of provisions, however, limit the
government’s ability to conduct political trials.43
The First Amendment is the basic constraint. It prohibits
Congress from passing laws against political opposition in general and
thus from authorizing the prosecution of individuals solely on the
ground of their opposition to government policy. However, in times
of stress, the courts have relaxed First Amendment constraints.
During the Cold War, the Supreme Court permitted a crackdown on
the American Communist Party, in part because of its connection

38. I will discuss international law in Part IV.
39. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
40. R AOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 56–59 (1973).
41. See Articles of Impeachment Against Andrew Johnson, art. X, Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1615 (1868) (“[President Johnson] did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule,
hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress . . . [and] to impair and destroy the regard and
respect of all the good people of the United States for the Congress and legislative power
thereof . . . .”); Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson Clinton, art. IV, H.R. Res.
611, 105th Cong. (1998) (“William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office,
has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a
manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the
United States.”).
42. BERGER, supra note 40, at 53–59.
43. There are also political trials under the laws of the states, and various state
constitutional and statutory constraints, which I will ignore. A few examples are discussed in
BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 223–25, which describes the efforts of state bar associations,
beginning with Maryland and New York, to secure counsel for accused Communists.
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with the Soviet threat.44 The Supreme Court subsequently repudiated
this line of cases, but only after the Cold War had begun to thaw.45
Current doctrine holds that the government can target political
opponents only if they cause harm in the course of their political
activities (such as robbing a bank to finance their party) or pose a
threat to public order via “imminent lawless action” (such as inciting
mob violence).46
A further constraint on political trials is the Due Process Clause,
which requires the judge to grant the defendant process rights. The
great importance of the Due Process Clause lies in its restrictions on
simple fraudulent (or aggressive) conduct on the part of the
executive. If the defendant has not violated any laws, not even
generally applicable laws, the government may be tempted to cut
procedural corners. At the extreme, the government fabricates
evidence and bullies witnesses. None of this is unknown, but in the
more common case the defendant’s legal guilt is ambiguous. The
government may then strengthen its case by withholding information
from the defendant’s lawyer, forcing the defendant to confess to a
crime he did not commit or manipulating him into such a confession,
playing on the fears of the jury, and so forth. The various due process
and related constitutional rights—to have a lawyer, to have a jury, to
call witnesses, to examine evidence, to cross-examine witnesses—limit
this kind of prosecutorial abuse.
The Due Process Clause does not prohibit prosecutorial
discretion: prosecutors are free to bring cases against X rather than Y,
even though they committed the same crimes, or even if Y’s crime is

44. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951); see also Wiecek, supra note 29, at
406–07.
45. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303 (1957); see also BELKNAP, supra note 4, at
157.
46. The current doctrine requires “imminent” harm, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969), but that has not always been the case. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
In other democratic countries, such as Germany, which proscribes the Nazi Party, and Turkey,
which periodically proscribes Islamic parties, there is no such requirement. See John E. Finn,
Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-democratic Parties, in THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 51, 70–74 (David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg
eds., 2001) (listing these proscriptions as well as those in other countries); Walter F. Murphy,
Excluding Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory , in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW 173, 180–87 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (comparing
German and American policies on excluding certain pa rties from participation in the political
process).
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worse.47 The prosecutor might have any number of motives: resource
constraints and difficulty of proof, the value of making an example of
one defendant rather than another, and so forth. The Supreme Court
has held only that the prosecutor’s motive cannot be invidious, and
this typically means that the prosecutor cannot have racist motives
(for example) or want to punish a defendant for asserting a legal right
in a prior case.48 Although bringing prosecutions for political ends
would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause, courts are so
deferential—they require proof of the government’s motive rather
than just a pattern of prosecuting political opponents who happen to
violate general laws—that there is no discernible restriction on this
practice.49
A final important constraint on the political trial in the U.S. is
structural. The separation of powers requires, in most cases, some
degree of cooperation among all three branches if a political trial is to
succeed. Congress can block political trials by declining to enact laws
that target political opponents, refusing to enact very general laws
that can be selectively enforced against political opponents, and
defunding or otherwise constraining executive branch officials and
judges who favor political trials.50 The executive can undermine
political prosecutions authorized by Congress by refusing to pursue
them with zeal, or, when authorized, by establishing regulations that
constrain its own officials.51 The judiciary can undermine political
prosecutions by throwing up procedural barriers such as burdens of
proof, refusing requests for secrecy, and interpreting the

47. Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1279–83 (2002).
48. Id. at 1286–94.
49. Id. at 1285–87 & n.651; see, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)
(upholding prosecution of draft resisters selected because they had expressed an intention not
to register); United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 311 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding prosecution
despite prosecution memo that identified the defendant’s political party); see also United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–66 (1996) (describing the high standard for asserting a selective
prosecution claim).
50. However, various administrations have argued that the president’s Article II powers
authorize him to detain and try enemy combatants without congressional authorization. The
Supreme Court has, so far, declined to express a view on this argument; for its most recent
statement, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639–40 (2004).
51. A good example of this is the foot-dragging of the acting secretary of labor during the
Red Scare of the 1920s. Another is Attorney General Biddle’s reluctance to enforce the Smith
Act during World War II, except when prodded by Roosevelt. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 38–40.
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constitutional provisions mentioned above in an expansive fashion.52
As each institution wants to protect itself, and as each institution
(except for the presidency) is always staffed by members of both
parties, political trials (at the federal level) of members of mainstream
parties are rare. Instead, political trials have been conducted mainly
against people whom both parties regard as political opponents,
usually extremists at either end of the political spectrum.53
All of what has been said so far is confined to the American
experience; political trials in other constitutional democracies are
usually not as heavily regulated by constitutional provisions or
tradition. The impeachment power was frequently used by the British
parliament in its historical efforts to rein in the King; these political
trials are generally thought to have enhanced liberty and the rule of
law because they were used against the person who posed the chief
threat to them. Impeachment was also a powerful tool against official
corruption in all parts of government. This history influenced the
drafters of the American Constitution, who included the
impeachment power in part as a bulwark against the feared
monarchical tendencies of a president and in part as a lever against
corruption.54
Much has been written about impeachment recently,55 and so my
focus will be on the use of the normal criminal trial for political ends
in the American system and on international and transitional trials.

52. For example , Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 310 (1957), narrowed the Smith Act.
Even before Yates, many trial judges declined to impose the maximum penalty for Smith Act
violations. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 158.
53. Such groups have included the American Communist Party, e.g., Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951), and the Ku Klux Klan, e.g., Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 60,
63 (1928) (upholding a state law that required KKK members to register with the state). The
view that Reconstruction-era trials of KKK members were political is defended in Kermit L.
Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials,
1871–1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921 (1984). Professor Hall argues that the trials were used to
consolidate Republican power in the South; however, Hall’s definition of political trial is
broader than that used here.
54. See BERGER, supra note 40, at 7 –52; see generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H.
HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805 (1984).
55. See generally WILLIAM R EHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS (1992); Joseph Isenbergh,
Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y R EV. 53
(1999); Cass Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA . L. R EV. 279 (1998).
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II. THEORY
A. Liberal Legalism
Legalism is the view that courts should resolve social conflicts by
applying preexisting rules to the conduct of individuals, who are given
an opportunity to defend themselves. The defendant has a right to
make a defense, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, have an
impartial judge and jury, and so forth. Collectively, this package of
rights is known as the right to due process. Legalism can be
understood as the view that the right to judicial process is paramount
and that due process should never be violated, or violated only in the
most unusual conditions.56
Legalism is not incompatible with laws against political
opposition. A law that bans criticism of the state or government is
such a law; a court could enforce the law without violating the right to
judicial process as long as the defendant is given the opportunity to
mount a defense. The joint commitment to legalism and political
tolerance is “liberal legalism, ” which includes the idea that courts
should not permit the government to ban political speech or
opposition except when it causes immediate harm—for example,
incitement to riot.57
Political trials cannot occur in a regime of liberal legalism as long
as legal institutions uphold this ideal. But real democracies only
approximate liberal legalism; they sometimes enact laws against
political opposition. Moreover, the more common type of political
trial occurs when process is relaxed in violation of the ideal of
legalism so that general laws that do not target political opponents
can be used as a pretext for doing just that.
From the perspective of liberal legalism, such trials are
illegitimate unless, as Professor Shklar suggests, there is something
like a state of war or civil insurrection. Shklar allows liberal states to
relax their own principles to defend themselves, but as previously
noted, she tries to place this exception within a legalistic framework.58

56. Legalism is more or less synonymous with the notion of the rule of law, though it has a
pejorative connotation, suggesting excessive concern with following the rules. On this, see the
essays collected in DEMOCRACY AND THE R ULE OF LAW, supra note 8.
57. This seems to be Professor Shklar’s view with respect to the domestic setting, which
puts great weight on the harm principle. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 60–70.
58. Id. at 219–20.
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If a court determines that a state of war exists, then it might relax the
rules of process or defer to executive action such as the establishment
of military commissions.59 Why shouldn’t courts relax process if a
substantial threat short of war exists? Shklar insists that such thinking
is “utopian” and unpragmatic and that courts should not be involved
in deterring mere threats.60 But, she does not persuasively explain
why relaxing process in this way violates liberal principles.
B. An Instrumental Theory of Liberal Legalism
Academic defenders of liberal legalism normally provide
philosophical justifications for this system, arguing that liberal
legalism—also called liberal democracy, or constitutional democracy,
or the rule of law, depending on whether more emphasis is put on
liberalism or legalism—promotes welfare or fairness, or respects
human dignity, or maintains social peace more effectively than
alternative systems.61 Without expressing a view on these approaches,
I will take a different approach that emphasizes rational choice on the
part of individuals or groups with power. I approach liberal legalism
not as a system of values imposed on the government, but as a
reflection of the principles and attitudes that would be taken by a
rational government in a democratic system, one that seeks to
maximize its political support.62
A government, as I use the term, consists of the people who
control the policy and activities of the state. In a parliamentary
system, the government is typically controlled by a single party or a
coalition of parties; the opposition, then, consists of the party or
parties that are out of power. In a presidential system, the
government is typically controlled by the president’s party, but the
president may be forced to share power with opposition parties if
they control the legislature. In any event, I want to distinguish, very

59. The lure of legalism remains, however, as can be seen in the judicial response to the
War on Terror. For example, contrast the government’s view that it can classify individuals,
including Americans, as enemy combatants with virtually no judicial oversight (a view endorsed
by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2683 (2004)), and detain
them for the duration of hostilities, and the Hamdi plurality’s view that a person classified as an
enemy combatant is entitled to due process protections if the classification is contested, id. at
2645–52.
60. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 214–15, 217–19.
61. See generally ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
62. This is roughly the approach of Holmes, supra note 8, and Przeworski, supra note 8.
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roughly, the “majority party” or “party in power” from the
(mainstream) “opposition party.” In liberal democracies, the various
mainstream parties compete for power within a legal framework; the
opposition party is not outlawed or forced to suffer legal disabilities.
In some democracies, extremist parties may be outlawed or regulated;
in others, they may be able to share power.
I assume that the government’s main goal is to stay in power, and
that a party’s main goal is either to maintain power (if it has it) or
obtain power (if it does not). All political actors know that they
cannot maintain power unless they implement policies desired by the
general public, including (but not exclusively) their political base.
One such policy is security, broadly conceived. Virtually every
member of the public seeks security both against internal threats such
as those posed by criminal activity and against external threats such
as invasion by hostile foreign countries.
It might seem that the best way to deter crime is to deny all rights
to criminals, and simply seize and punish anyone who has committed
a crime. Once the police have satisfied themselves that a particular
person committed a crime, they would punish the individual without
going through the risky and tedious business of a trial. The usual
objections to this approach are that trials promote fairness and
accuracy and that they prevent the government from arresting and
convicting people who are vulnerable but did not commit any crime,
so as to make a show of responding to the public’s fear of crime
without having to expend resources on a criminal investigation. But
these objections are not persuasive. If law enforcement routinely
convicts the wrong people, then criminals will be encouraged rather
than deterred. If the government cannot keep criminal behavior at a
low level, it will lose public support.
The main problem with denying procedural protections to
criminal defendants is that without such protections the government
can use its monopoly on force to harass, detain, or eliminate its
political opponents. Authoritarian countries, in fact, frequently do
this, but liberal democracies do not. Why not?
The tempting answer is “the courts”: independent courts prevent
governments in liberal democracies from suppressing political
opposition. The problem with this answer is that many authoritarian
countries do have courts, and the courts of many liberal democracies
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are not independent.63 The answer also begs the question why
governments bent on suppressing political opposition do not push
courts out of their way; this is exactly what happens in weak
democracies. The question, then, can be reframed as follows: why do
governments in liberal democracies with weak courts restrain
themselves from suppressing political opposition, and why do
governments in liberal democracies restrain themselves from
undermining strong courts so that they can suppress political
opposition?
The better answer is that a government that depends on the
consent of the public cannot take the risk of allowing the public to
think that the government eliminates political opponents who enjoy
the support of at least some of the public. Any particular criminal
defendant may be an ordinary criminal, but the defendant may also
be an attractive political target because of his or her leadership of, or
membership in, the opposition party, or because the defendant’s
activities have symbolic importance for the opposition party. The
public, especially the leaders and members of the opposition political
party, will sometimes not know with confidence whether the
government targets a particular criminal defendant because the
defendant has actually committed crimes or poses a threat to security
or because he or she poses a mere political (or partisan) threat to the
government or party in power. If the public does not know whether
the government uses its monopoly on power to target political
opponents, or if it believes that the government does, it may withdraw
support from the existing government and look for alternatives. The
reason is that a government that uses force against opponents rather
than criminals is not providing maximum security, and indeed may be
pursuing policies that benefit the government itself or its circle of
supporters rather than the public at large.
The problem is one of asymmetric information, and the historic
solution in Western states is liberal legalism. There are two points
here. First, liberalism forbids the criminalization of political
opposition, and it manifests itself in formal law as freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and the other basic political rights. A
government that voluntarily consents to laws that protect opposition
parties has taken the first step toward showing that it is a government

63. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721,
721–22 (1994).
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that serves the public interest. Such a government maintains its power
not by intimidating political opponents, but by creating good policy
that pleases the public, which will reward the government by
returning it to power.
Second, legalism ensures that the government will not
circumvent the basic political rights through subterfuge. The judicial
process forces the government to show that the defendant is an actual
criminal or public threat, not just a political opponent. The
government must show that the defendant has violated a law—that is,
a rule with democratic credentials. The government must persuade an
independent judge and jury that the defendant violated the law. Rules
of evidence and publicity ensure that the public can evaluate the
government’s case. Legalism prevents the typical subterfuge by which
a government targets political opponents not by eliminating them or
outlawing their parties but by accusing them of committing crimes
that they did not commit or of crimes that are not generally enforced.
None of this suggests that a government will always adopt liberal
legalism, or that liberal legalism is necessarily self-perpetuating. If a
government believes that its political opponents are likely to win the
next ele ction, the government might think that it has little to lose by
prosecuting them. In the United States, this occurred only once—and
while it was still an unstable quasi democracy—during the Sedition
Act trials of the late eighteenth century, when Federalists used the
judicial process to fend off political attacks by Republican
newspapers.64 In stable democracies, the reason that such trials do not
occur more often is that the reputational cost is so high: a party that
uses its control over government to prosecute its political opponents
will lose public support. Indeed, the Sedition Act prosecutions
backfired, made martyrs of Republican writers and editors, and
contributed to the defeat of the Federalists. The experiment would
not be repeated.65
In sum, governments grant judicial process and refrain from
banning political opposition as a way of showing that their policies
are in the public interest. When this kind of self-restraint becomes
entrenched in a society, the state is both liberal and legalistic. A

64. SMITH, supra note 4, at 186.
65. Id. at 431. Smith provides several examples that show that defendants convicted of
Sedition Act violations often became heroes; in one case, the defendant was an elected official
who was rewarded with reelection after he was released from prison. See, e.g., id. at 238, 241,
244, 274, 395.
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government that goes to the trouble of eliminating its political
opponents does so only because it fears that these opponents are
likely to attract followers, which can be the case only if a large
segment of the public can be persuaded that the government’s
policies do not benefit it or are otherwise wrong or unjust. If this is
the case, the elimination of political opponents—however attractive
for narrow political reasons—is likely to give rise to the inference that
the government’s policies are bad and thus to result in a loss of
political support.
This theory is not incompatible with the philosophical view that
political rights and judicial process are necessary because of fairness
or to show respect for human dignity. Indeed, the instrumental theory
of liberal legalism shows why a power-maximizing government will
adopt liberal policies that many people find attractive on normative
grounds. It thus shows why liberal legalism is politically robust, why
governments sometimes voluntary introduce liberal reforms, and why
liberal legalism can be attractive to governments in societies (such as
Japan) that do not have a long liberal tradition but instead emphasize
the collective good. The theory also shows why liberal legalism faces
limits, the subject of the next Section.
C. Departures from Liberal Legalism: Political Trials
If liberal legalism has instrumental value for governments in the
way that I have described, then governments will be tempted to
depart from liberal legalism under two conditions. First, the
government faces an unusually dangerous threat that cannot be
adequately addressed within the existing legal framework. Second,
the government enjoys an unusually high level of trust among
citizens, so that it need not worry too much about creating suspicions
by denying process in selected cases.
As to the first point, a government knows that if it cannot protect
the people, they will eventually withdraw support. So its priority is
security. Threats to security can be purely internal but can also be
external. The normal internal threat is everyday crime. Many
governments can keep crime at tolerable levels without departing
from liberal legalism. To be sure, the norms of legal liberalism are not
rigid and are relaxed or tightened incrementally as circumstances
warrant. When crime increases as a result of an exogenous shock—
new drugs, new technologies—authorities almost always pass laws or
take actions that depart incrementally from liberal legalism. The drug
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crisis stemming from the spread of crack cocaine led to a relaxation of
liberal legalism across several dimensions: (1) vague laws that enabled
prosecutors to target the most dangerous criminals, (2) broad
complicity rules that enabled prosecutors to reach all members of a
drug gang, and (3) antiassociation laws that enabled police to prevent
congregation of gang members on the street.66 But the more
significant test for liberal legalism is terrorism or domestic insurgency,
and here most liberal states have departed much farther from liberal
legalism, usually for the duration of the crisis, by claiming broad
powers to be exercised only against the terrorist threat.67
An even more important test of a government’s commitment to
liberal legalism is the external threat. During wartime, virtually all
legal protections may be suspended and military rule imposed,
depending on the extent of the threat. In the United States, the Civil
War resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus, World War I in
aggressive sedition laws, and World War II in martial law in Hawaii
and the relocation of Americans of Japanese ancestry on the
mainland.68 Soviet-led international Communism furnished ample
reason, in the minds of American authorities, for relaxing liberal
legalism in the 1920s and again in the 1950s. Today, Islamic terrorism
is the chief external threat to American security and the excuse for
relaxing process protections.
As to the second point, when people believe that the government
does not seek to eliminate its opponents, they are more likely to
tolerate reductions in process: although reducing process may
enhance error, this by itself will not disadvantage opponents or
entrench the existing authorities. One common method that
governments use to enhance trust during eme rgencies is to invite
political opponents into the government itself. Parliamentary systems
often produce war cabinets with representatives from the party that is
out of power. In the United States, the most famous example is the
participation of the Republicans Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox
in Franklin Roosevelt’s cabinet during World War II. Members of the
opposition political party with knowledge of the internal workings of

66. There is a large literature on this topic. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (gang loitering
laws); Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2004) (vague laws).
67. See POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 20–23 (Baader-Meinhof Gang);
id. at 168–71 (Irish Republican Army).
68. See generally STONE, supra note 4, for a recent discussion.
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the government can be expected to raise a fuss if they discover the
government is using its emergency powers to persecute their
colleagues and supporters.69
Let me put the argument in a more stylized form. Suppose that
the possible defendant in a criminal trial—if not simply an ordinary
criminal—may be either a “public threat” or a “political opponent” of
the government. A public threat is a person, such as a terrorist, who is
likely to harm the general public or the constitutional system; a
political opponent is a person who poses a threat to an existing
government but not to the public—the case of normal political
opposition. Because the public threat has not committed any crime,
the defendant cannot be convicted of a crime if given normal, that is,
“high,” process. Assume that conviction is possible if the defendant is
given “low” process.
When the government uses high process, people who are public
threats, or are suspected of being public threats, are acquitted and set
free. If they engage in terrorist attacks or support subversion, the
public will react by saying to the government, “If you cannot protect
us, we’ll find another (less scrupulous) government that will.” The
dilemma faced by the government is that it might, with the
acquiescence of the courts,70 rationally grant a low amount of process
in response, allowing it to convict public threats. But at the same
time, the government knows that if it uses low process, the public will
begin to suspect that the government may be targeting political
opponents. As long as the public assumes that the government is
using low process to eliminate political opponents, the government
has nothing to lose and much to gain from actually doing so.71 And
69. In the United States, the executive branch might also seek broad support from
Congress, as emphasized by Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil
Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during
Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 4, at 161, 187–94, and by Professor
Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. R EV. 47, 75–77. However, given that the
problem of distrust is partisan rather than institutional, I would argue that it was more
important for Roosevelt to appoint Knox and Stimson to his cabinet than for him to obtain the
acquiescence of the Democratic Congress.
70. I will discuss later the extent to which governments can expect judges to acquiesce in
this way. See Part III.C. For now, assume that judges will do what they think the government
wants them to do.
71. See Finn, supra note 46, at 66. Discussing the World War I trials, Professor Peterson
notes that “it is a fact that almost immediately after the beginning of World War I people of the
political right used the war as an excuse to attack people of the left. They did so by accusing
leftists of being disloyal.” PETERSON & FITE, supra note 4, at 45; see also id. at 213–21
(discussing the way the sedition law was used against leftist groups).
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the public might rationally tolerate low process if the public threat is
serious enough. So, the government must choose between
maintaining high process, addressing the threat inadequately, and
then risking public support because of security concerns, or reducing
process, addressing the threat properly, but risking public support
because of the perceived reduction in political competition. And
although the ability to target political opponents using low process
may help the government maintain its power, this advantage may not
compensate for the loss of public confidence.
There may be other ways for government to finesse these
difficulties. Instead of granting low process to all criminal defendants,
it could offer high process to “ordinary” criminals and low process to
a class of people whom the public believes more likely to pose a real
threat. The American government, in fact, has done this quite
frequently, granting lower process to aliens, people who openly
identify themselves with extremist groups (Communists, Islamic
fundamentalists), and enemy soldiers.72 These people may also be
subject to greater surveillance than ordinary citizens. The government
can also grant higher-than-normal process to people who belong to
mainstream opposition parties; this helps avoid the inference that the
government’s motives are narrowly political.
To summarize the argument thus far, one can imagine the
following sequence of events. First, some emergency or apparent
emergency occurs, and the public demands protection against the real
or imaginary threat. Second, the government responds by reducing
procedural protections. At one extreme, it might suspend habeas
corpus and declare martial law. But the reduction of procedural
protections could take subtler forms: the enactment of new laws, or
the invocation of long dormant ones, that target seditious, disloyal, or
dangerous behavior; reliance on newly broad interpretations of
existing laws allowing their use against the perceived threats; refusal
by judges and juries to give certain types of defendants the benefit of
the doubt; relaxed evidentiary standards; restrictions on defense
lawyers’ access to their clients; and so forth. Third, the government
now has greater freedom of action, which it can use against political
opponents as well as the people who pose the new public threat. A
rational, power-maximizing government will use its freedom of action
72. This was Justice Jackson’s argument in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567–69
(1951). See supra note 29 and accompanying text. On trials of enemy soldiers, see Part IV.A
infra.
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to pursue both types of person. Fourth, the public realizes that the
government can use its freedom of action against partisan opponents
as well as public threats. The public may partially or fully withdraw
support from the government because it fears political persecution of
marginal or even mainstream political opponents of the government,
but it also may accept this reduction in political competition as an
acceptable price to pay for enhanced security. Defendants in criminal
trials will exploit this public unease and claim to be political
opponents (when such a claim is plausible) whether or not they in fact
are. Critics of the government will call these “political trials.”
At this point, it might be useful to return to the definition of the
political trial. “Political trial” is usually used as an epithet, and so it is
tempting to stipulate that a trial is political only if the government
uses its freedom of action to target political opponents rather than
genuine public threats. Partisan trials are almost always objectionable
because they violate the principle of political competition at the heart
of liberal democracy. One could adopt this narrow definition of
political trial, but then one would need a word for criminal trials of
defendants who are not merely political opponents but are in fact also
public threats—threats to the entire constitutional system or to the
well-being of many people —who have not committed ordinary
crimes. The better approach is to use a broad definition of political
trial, a definition that encompasses both the partisan trial of political
opponents and the more public-spirited trial of public threats. The
reason is that the latter type of trial violates the rule of law: it is
political, not legal, albeit political in the broader, less objectionable
sense—a matter of (possibly wise) policy rather than a vindication of
the law. A further reason for using the broad definition is that most
relevant trials fall between the two extremes: anarchist, Communist,
or Islamic terrorists are both political opponents in the narrow sense
and also threats (even if remote and long term) to the constitutional
system. The final and decisive reason for using the broad definition is
that the political trial (in the broad sense) creates institutional design
challenges that the ordinary criminal trial does not. For example, a
judge who presides over political trials might appropriately change
the rules of process to interfere with partisan prosecutions while
permitting convictions of public threats.
Political trials can be contrasted with show trials, such as those
conducted by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and many Soviet
satellites. Defendants were tortured or threatened offstage, then at
trial would confess to whatever crimes the government charged them
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with, so as to avoid being tortured or shot afterwards and to spare
their families the same fate. The defendants were, in effect, unpaid
actors in a propaganda film. Show tria ls cut the Gordian knot:
governments eliminate partisan opponents as well as public threats
without losing public support through the simple expedient of only
pretending that they grant process protections. If the public believes
the government, the government’s problems are solved.73 But the
pretense cannot be maintained indefinitely even in an authoritarian
state, and show trials usually stop after a few years. Show trials are
not an option in an open society because they would require the
collaboration of people with different political views and goals—
prosecutors, judges, lawyers, juries—or else the wholesale destruction
of existing institutions, which itself would alert people to the
government’s intentions.74
D. Summary, Evidence, Implications
Liberal legalism is an instrumental strategy used by governments
to maximize political support in societies that have a general interest
in security but tolerate normal political opposition. Liberal legalism
enables the government to minimize internal threats to public
security to the largest extent possible, consistent with the need to
reassure the public that it will not maintain its power by harassing
political opponents. When security threats increase, the government

73. Some people might argue that the purpose of show trials is to instill fear and intimidate
the public, which is supposed to know that the defendant’s confession was the result of torture,
and thus that torture is the punishment for political opposition. This is, at best, a small portion
of the truth: disappearances or, for that matter, overt violence against political opponents would
have served (and did serve) the purpose of intimidation. The great show trials in the Soviet
Union had the specific purpose of discrediting Stalin’s opponents, intended for foreign as well as
domestic audiences (foreign journalists were invited to attend the trials). The trials did not fool
everyone in the West, as the charges were often absurd, and some of the facts asserted in the
trials could be checked out and disproved. But they did fool many influential people in the
West, including politicians, journalists, artists, and intellectuals. See R OBERT CONQUEST, THE
GREAT TERROR 91 (1990) (describing foreign observers at the trial of the old Bolsheviks); id. at
105–08 (describing the Western reception of the trial); id. at 463–76 (describing the Western
reaction to all of the trials of the 1936–1938 period).
74. There is a sliding scale, and some devices used in a political trial can make it hard to
distinguish from a show trial. In France, the “amalgam” was a device for associating a political
opponent with ordinary criminals with whom the defendant never conspired but shared some
superficial similarity. One trial in 1894 brought together some anarchists, whose offense was
only political, with ordinary criminals, who justified their crimes using anarchist rhetoric but
who otherwise had no association with the political defendants. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 34,
at 196 & n.40. The fiction here was more than the court could tolerate.
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departs incrementally from liberal legalism because the public in such
times is willing to tolerate a marginal increase in the harassment of
(usually extreme) political opponents in return for greater security.
As a result, political trials occur. These trials may target both
authentic public threats and partisan political opponents. If the gain
in security is large enough that the public as a whole benefits, even
though the government can increasingly use political trials to enhance
its power, then erosion of liberal legalism is likely to be tolerated, at
least for the duration of the emergency.75
The history of political trials in the United States supports the
thesis that in a liberal democracy, political trials are more likely to be
(politically) successful when defendants are extremists than when
they are mainstream opponents. The Sedition Act trials of
Jeffersonian Republicans were a spe ctacular failure: rather than
destroy the Republicans, they destroyed the Fe deralists.76 The
impeachment of Federalist Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, this time at
the instigation of Republicans, was another failure.77 These failures
helped establish the legitimacy of political competition between
mainstream parties in the United States;78 the implicit bargain—that
the judicial process will not be used against mainstream partisan
opponents—has held, more or less, for two hundred years.
Subsequent political trials can be divided into two categories.
First, there were trials of people who had virtually no mainstream
political support: anarchists, Nazi sympathizers, and Communists.
Although the trials of these people often took place in a circuslike
atmosphere, the evidence suggests that the public approved of the
trials and convictions and that the political standing of the

75. A complementary philosophical treatment can be found in JOHN E. FINN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL V IOLENCE AND THE R ULE OF LAW (1991). Professor
Finn argues that, during eme rgencies, the commitment to constitutionalism can be maintained,
even as a particular constitution’s re quirements are evaded, as long as certain elemental
requirements of constitutionalism—reason, deliberation, etc.—are satisfied. Id. at 5–7.
76. SMITH, supra note 4, at 432–33.
77. A more ambiguous example is the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. See POLITICAL
TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 47–50. Burr was a political enemy of Jefferson, but by
1807 he probably could not be considered a part of the mainstream opposition. However,
Justice Marshall, who derailed the trial by defining “treason” narrowly, was. But see Robert K.
Faulkner, John Marshall and the Burr Trial, 53 J. AM. HIST. 247, 247 (1966) (criticizing the view
that Marshall’s interpretation of treason law showed political bias).
78. See Richard E. Ellis, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE
Y OUNG R EPUBLIC 278–79 (1971).
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government improved as a result of them.79 Second, there were trials
of people whose views were somewhere between moderate and
extreme: opponents of the Civil War, World War I, and the Vie tnam
War. These trials were only moderately successful, as one might
expect. Civil War–era military trials of dissenters may have
maintained order but were highly controversial and politically
damaging.80 World War I–era espionage and sedition prosecutions
were popular and may have helped the war effort, but they also
enhanced the prestige of radical politicians like Eugene De bs.81
Vietnam War–era prosecutions like the Chicago 8 trial seem to have
both discouraged violent protests and weakened support for the
national government and its policies.82
Use of political trials only against serious public threats, and not
as a routine weapon against political opponents, can reflect selfrestraint by prosecuting authorities, and need not be imposed by third
parties such as courts. The history of Great Britain supports this
proposition, as does self-restraint in the use of the impeachment
power in the United States.83 For that matter, so does the selfrestraint of executive branch officials, even when there has been
short-term public support for political trials. However, in the United
States, the judiciary has a great deal of prestige, and it can interfere
with political trials that the government is inclined to pursue. Thus, it
is useful to consider the perspective of the judge and ask how judges
79. See, e.g., AVRICH, supra note 10, at 280–85 (anarchists); BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 113
(Communists). However, it is important to note that these trials created a political backlash.
Several of the Haymarket defendants were ultimately pardoned, and the trial radicalized many
workers. See AVRICH, supra note 10, at 307–12 (after trial); id. at 409–14 (after executions); id.
at 433–36 (long-term effect).
80. During the Civil War, a large number of Northerners suspected of Southern sympathies
were detained by the military, with no judicial process. The precise number is unknown, but it
was probably in the hundreds (if one limits oneself to the clearest cases) or thousands
(especially if one includes draft resisters, unexplained arrests, and so forth). See MARK E.
N EELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 51–65, 113–38
(1991) (describing arrests and detentions). Detainees did receive military hearings, which
involved regular procedures. Id. at 162–75.
81. Harold Josephson, Political Justice During the Red Scare: The Trial of Benjamin Gitlow,
in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS , supra note 10, at 154 (“[T]he trials . . . created martyrs and
enabled radicals to use the issues of freedom of speech and political liberty to rally broad liberal
support to their cause.”).
82. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS,
supra note 10, at 249 (“[T]he defendants’ effort to appeal over the court to the general public
seemingly fell on deaf ears.”).
83. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 54, at 3–8 (discussing Great Britain), 256–63
(discussing early state and federal impeachments in the United States).
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manage a criminal trial that is, or might be, motivated by the political
goals of the government.
III. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
A political trial balances two values: the value of convicting a
defendant who poses a risk to the government or the public and the
value of maintaining the public’s confidence that the government
does not target political opponents. Ordinary judicial process,
involving relatively specific laws that prohibit harmful behavior,
reflects the weight of the second value. The question raised by the
political trial is whether process should be relaxed (or enhanced), and
in what ways. This Part illustrates the trade -offs involved, focusing on
laws against political opposition; charges and evidence; the roles of
the judge, jury, and defense lawyer; and control of publicity. When
lawyers think of these design elements, they usually focus on the
trade -off between accuracy in determining guilt (convicting the guilty,
not the innocent) and administrative cost (perfect accuracy can be
purchased only at infinite expense). The focus here is instead on the
trade -off between accuracy in evaluating the threat (convicting
dangerous people, not mere political opponents or critics) and
maintaining the credibility of the government.
A. Laws against Political Opposition
The most recognizable political trial is an ordinary trial for
violation of a law that prohibits political opposition to the
government. Authoritarian states have often enacted such laws. The
law might prohibit the formation of political parties aside from the
ruling party, any kind of political activity that opposes the
government, subversive activity, advocacy of policies that are
contrary to government policies, and so forth. A trial in which all the
forms of legality are respected would nonetheless result in the
conviction of a defendant because of political views or activities.
Liberal democracies do not have laws prohibiting mainstream
political opposition: tolerance of formal political opposition is the key
distinction between the liberal democratic system and the
authoritarian system. But the amount of tolerance is not absolute.
Turkey—whose democratic credentials are solid but not perfect—
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bans fundamentalist Islamic parties.84 Germany prohibits parties that
oppose its constitutional system.85 Other democracies have similar
bans on extremist parties and subversive activities that are contrary to
the constitutional order.86 Thus, they make a distinction between
mainstream political dissent, which is tolerated, and constitutional
dissent, which is not.
In the United States, there have been five overt attempts to
suppress political dissent. The Sedition Act of 1798 prohibited “false,
scandalous and malicious” statements about the government, but it
was interpreted broadly so that it could be used to prosecute
mainstream Republican opponents of the John Adams
administration.87 Martial law during the Civil War permitted the
military to try and punish people who criticized the Lincoln
administration’s conduct of the war.88 The Espionage and Sedition
Acts of 1917–1918 were directed against obstruction of recruitment
and interference with the military, but they were broadly interpreted
to prohibit criticism of American participation in World War I.89 The
Smith Act of 1940 prohibited advocacy of violent revolution against
the government and was also interpreted broadly until 1957.90 The
Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954
“effectively criminalized the Communist party.”91 Of these cases, only
the Sedition Act of 1798 was, as interpreted by judges, a clear effort
to suppress dissent by a mainstream group. The Espionage and
Sedition Acts and the Smith Act targeted extremists, although these
extremists did include prominent people (such as Eugene Debs) who
had large followings. The Civil War case is ambiguous.
Why would a government prosecute members of fringe parties or
people with idiosyncratic political beliefs? By assumption, these

84. BEVERLEY MILTON-EDWARDS, ISLAM & POLITICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
73 (2004).
85. See Finn, supra note 46, at 56 (quoting Article 21(2) of the German Constitution:
“Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of
Germany, shall be unconstitutional . . . .”).
86. Id. at 70–74 (describing laws of Chile, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Portugal, Romania, and Rwanda).
87. SMITH, supra note 4, at 94–95, 176–87.
88. See R ANDALL , supra note 10, at 177–85.
89. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–98.
90. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 337 (1957).
91. Finn, supra note 46, at 60.
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people do not pose a threat, or much of a threat, to the political
dominance of the government. One reason is that such people may be
dangerous to the public. The U.S. government prosecuted
Communists not because they posed an electoral threat but because
they were loyal to America’s enemy, the Soviet Union. 92 The U.S.
government currently pursues al Qaeda sympathizers because they
might provide money, shelter, or other support to actual terrorists. If
the evidence of criminal behavior is not strong, the government
moves against these people based on an assessment of the risks. A
Communist ideologue might be a spy or know a spy.93 An al Qaeda
sympathizer—especially one with a great deal of wealth and ties to
fundamentalist Islamic groups—is a risk even if he or she has not
committed a crime or, given the standards of criminal law, cannot be
proven to have committed a crime. Such a sympathizer may also
demoralize the public by cheering on terrorist attacks, thereby
creating an atmosphere of insecurity. Thus, people with extreme
antigovernment beliefs are more likely to be public threats than
people without such beliefs—even ordinary criminals—and for this
reason governments may seek to prosecute them.
To prosecute such people without violating due process, the
government would need to rely on laws that directly prohibited such
activity. As discussed earlier there are, and have been, many such
laws—against subversion, conspiracy to violate the law, and the like—
but these laws have proven to be unpopular.94 The problem with
criminalizing membership in a particular organization like the
American Communist Party is that members can easily evade the law
by disbanding the proscribed organization and setting up a new one.
If broader laws are used, and all seditious organizations or activities
are prohibited, then mainstream organizations can too easily be swept
within their net, a possibility that inevitably provokes widespread
political opposition—understandably so, as the government may find
itself unable to resist the temptation to enforce the laws against
mainstream political opponents.
If a government cannot enact laws against political opposition,
then it will find itself hampered in its efforts to prosecute public

92. STONE, supra note 4, at 410.
93. The Soviets preferred agents with an ideological motivation because they were more
reliable than paid agents. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 419.
94. SMITH, supra note 4, at 431–37; POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–
98.
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threats who have not engaged in clearly illegal or violent acts. Its best
hope is to bring charges under a general law against disorderly or
subversive behavior,95 or even unrelated laws against, say, wire fraud
or extortion,96 and then to persuade the judge to acquiesce in
restrictions on process. These restrictions are the hallmark of political
trials in liberal democracies and the focus of the next several sections.
B. Charges, Defense, and Evidence
Legalism requires that defendants be charged with the violation
of an existing law; be informed of the charges against them, so that
they may prepare a defense; and be given access to evidence, so that
they may prove their case.
All of these elements of normal process interfere with the
prosecution of public threats. If the government does not have laws
against political or ideological opposition, it will not be able to apply
generally applicable rules against criminal behavior to people who
have not yet caused a harm or who are not on the verge of doing so. If
the government must candidly inform defendants that it has no legal
case against them, they will be able to make a plausible argument that
the trial is political. And the government may not be able to reveal
evidence that the defendants are a public threat without
compromising intelligence assets and harming security. In the
Rosenberg case, for example, some of the government’s evidence
came from secret cable intercepts that, if revealed, would have
permitted the Soviet Union to destroy valuable intelligence assets.97
The problem for the government is that if it denies process—for
95. General laws against disorderly and similar behavior that could sweep in political
activity are politically acceptable for familiar reasons: laws that are prospective and general
cannot be easily used against political opponents as they might sweep in political supporters as
well. See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399,
408–15 (2001).
96. Many scholars have noted that many federal (as well as state) laws are so broad and
vague that they can be used to criminalize almost any tort or even breach of contract. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. R EV. 193, 202–13 (1991) (discussing wire
fraud and the Hobbs Act). The effect of these laws is to give prosecutors a great deal of
discretion. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Decision, 46 UCLA L. R EV. 757, 758–60, 789–814 (1999) (discussing institutional
mechanisms for limiting prosecutorial discretion); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. R EV. 505, 512–19, 529–46 (2001) (discussing the reasons why
various political actors and interest groups prefer broad criminal laws).
97. R ONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE R OSENBERG FILE xv–xxii (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing the Venona project).
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example, if it tries defendants in secret to determine whether they are
a public threat—then it risks losing its credibility.
The government reduces these tensions in several ways.
Selective prosecution. First, the government prosecutes public
threats, when possible, for violating generally applicable laws—laws
against conspiracy, disorderly conduct, subversion, trespass,
incitement to riot, and so forth—that are not usually enforced against
ordinary people who do the things that the actual defendant did. This
approach is very much a compromise. On the one hand, the public
will be suspicious of the government because selective prosecution
can be used against political opponents. On the other, the harm to the
government’s reputation is mitigated by the facts that the generally
applicable laws have received public approval and that political
opponents can maintain their freedom by complying with these laws.
There may be a special hardship in complying with nanny taxes,
sodomy laws, and conspiracy laws to which no one else pays
attention, but it is not as bad as prosecution unconstrained by the law.
In addition, general laws often have lower sentences precisely
because they can be applied against so many people, so the
corresponding risk to political opposition is lessened.
Consider the following examples. In the prosecution of LeRoi
Jones in 1967, “it was uncertain whether Jones was on trial for a
stated or implied charge—for having possessed [two revolvers], or for
having been responsible, in some mysterious way, for the riots that
had engulfed Newark. ”98 The Chicago 8 were tried for conspiracy to
incite riots, but the prosecution’s real motivation was to suppress the
defendants’ vigorous and effective opposition to government policy
and to make an example of them. The East German head of
intelligence—to take an example from a transitional trial—was tried
for a murder he committed sixty years earlier; his real crime was his
leadership of East German intelligence.99
An extreme example comes from the Haymarket trial. The
defendants had advocated violent revolution, but no evidence linked
them to the bomb thrower (never caught) who killed the police
officers.100 The judge instructed the jury that the defendants could be
98. Kenneth M. Dolbeare & Joel B. Grossman, LeRoi Jones in Newark: A Political Trial? ,
in THEODORE LEWIS BECKER, POLITICAL TRIALS , 227–32 (1971).
99. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 817.
100. See AVRICH, supra note 10, at 268–75 (describing unsuccessful attempts to link the
defendants to the unidentified bomb thrower).
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convicted if they “by print or speech advised, or encouraged the
commission of murder, without designating time, place or occasion at
which it should be done.”101 The government sought to disrupt the
anarchist movement, and the murder became the occasion for
eliminating several of its leaders and frightening its members.
Governments can rarely be completely candid in political trials
because they do not want to admit that the trial violates due process,
even if the violation is justified for reasons of public security. Instead,
governments accuse the defendant of violating a general law, while
also arguing that the acute danger posed by the defendant justifies a
harsh sentence. Defendants might complain that, if they do not know
the real reason that the government is prosecuting them, they cannot
mount an effective defense. LeRoi Jones could have argued that he
could not defend himself if he thought the government was
prosecuting him for gun possession, when in fact the judge and jury
would have convicted him if they thought he caused the Newark riots.
Partial sharing of evidence. Second, the government may be
willing to reveal classified evidence to the judge or the defense lawyer
as long as it is not shared with the defendant. The defendant could
legitimately object that he or she will not be able to mount a sufficient
defense without having access to the information; he may not be able
to provide relevant mitigating evidence to his lawyer or the judge
unless he knows about the apparently inculpatory classified evidence.
Further, the public might believe that the evidence is not inculpatory
and that the defendant is merely a political opponent. One solution is
to shift the burden to the judge (or to the defense lawyer) in the hope
that the public will believe that the judge will evaluate the evidence
impartially and can evaluate it correctly without hearing the response
of the defendant. This solution can be effective—in the sense of
maintaining the government’s credibility while allowing it to convict
the defendant—only if the public believes that the judge is impartial
and the defendant’s inability to respond to the evidence does not
undermine the defendant’s ability to mount a defense. But then the
question becomes, why should the public trust the judge? I return to
this question in Section C.
Political defenses. Third, the court, with or without the
government’s acquiescence, may allow the defendant to assert a
political defense. Ordinary criminal defendants are rarely permitted

101.

Id. at 277.
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to argue that their crimes were justified because the government is
evil. There is no reason for an ordinary criminal trial to become a
forum for evaluating the government’s policies. But when the public
suspects that the defendant is being prosecuted for political views, it
may make sense to allow the defendant to mount a political defense.
If his or her views are extreme —for example, the defendant is an
anarchist who thinks that terrorism is justified—then the public will
be more likely to support the prosecution. If his or her views are
moderate, then it will be more likely that the defendant is not a public
threat and that the government’s motives are partisan. Thus, by
allowing defendants to make political statements, governments may
be able to show that a prosecution is appropriately directed toward a
public threat rather than motivated by partisanship.
The judge in the Debs case permitted the defendant to make a
speech defending his actions—opposition to American participation
in World War I—on political grounds.102 The judge in the Dennis case
prevented the defendants from arguing that the Communist Party had
an appealing political program and limited them to the question
whether the party had ever adv ocated violent revolution. 103 Both
trials were successes for the government and the judge; however, the
Debs trial was less disruptive—even though Debs was a more
politically popular figure.
The problem with allowing defendants to mount a political
defense is that they may persuade the public to take their side; even if
they do not, they may be able to undermine the public’s confidence in
the justice system by converting the trial into theater, preferably
farce. Mockery of the judge, grandstanding, and delay become the
defendant’s most powerful tools. Such disruptions may provoke the
judge to take harsh measures against the defendants, further showing
that the judge is complicit in the government’s effort to suppress
political dissent.
This strategy succeeded spectacularly in the trial of Elizabeth
Dilling and her codefendants—a group of Nazi sympathizers
prosecuted under the Smith Act during World War II—whose
lawyers objected to every act of the prosecutor and disputed every
ruling of the judge. The trial dragged on for months and then ended

102.
103.

PETERSON & FITE, supra note 4, at 252–54.
STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 223–24.
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abruptly with the death of the trial judge—from exhaustion, it was
said. A retrial, more than a year later, was dismissed.104
To deal with these problems, judges need great skill and
patience. The judges in the trial of Eugene Dennis and other
members of the American Communist Party in 1949, and in the trial
of the Chicago 8 in 1969, were considerably less tolerant of courtroom
theatrics than the Dilling judge was. The Dennis judge frequently cut
off the defendants and their lawyers. The Chicago 8 judge jailed
defendants and their lawyers for contempt. In taking these steps, the
judges opened themselves up to the accusation that they were
depriving the defendants of a fair trial. Numerous rulings of the
Chicago 8 judge were reversed on appeal. Although both judges
survived the ordeal,105 the Dennis judge was more successful; the
reason was almost surely that Dennis was, at the time of the trial, a
less sympathetic figure than were the Chicago 8. In 1949, America
was unified in its opposition to the Soviet Union, and therefore
Dennis was unpopular except among fringe groups. In 1969, by
contrast, America was divided over Vietnam, and the Chicago 8,
although politically extreme, enjoyed some mainstream support for
their stand against American militarism.
Judges can interrupt defendants who do not follow the rules and
hold defenses out of order. But defendants can complain about these
rulings, and so jurors and other witnesses might conclude that the
government’s motives are partisan, that the judge is complicit, and
that the defendants are political opponents rather than public threats.
Thus, like the other devices I have discussed, limiting the defense can
have ambiguous effects. It can increase the probability of convicting a
public threat by depriving the defendant of a defense, but it can also
cause the jury to acquit the defendant, or the public to withdraw
support from the government, because they suspect that the
defendant is merely a political opponent.
C. The Judge
Judges are supposed to be impartial: they enforce the rules
without bias toward the prosecution or the defense. For ordinary
criminal trials, the ideal of the impartial judge is attainable because
104. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 40.
105. For the Dennis trial, see BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 77–116, and STEINBERG, supra note
4, at 157–77; for the Chicago 8 trial, see David J. Danelski, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, in
BECKER, supra note 98, at 178–80.
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judges, whatever their hostility toward criminals, can enforce the
rules of due process and ensure that people likely to have committed
crimes are locked up in jail. These ordinary rules of process function
mainly to ensure that innocent people are not inadvertently
convicted.
Normal process no longer functions smoothly when the
defendant is a public threat who has not committed any crime. If no
law against political dissent or opposition exists, then the judge can
ensure conviction of the public threat only by relaxing the rule of law.
In this way, the judge must be complicit in the government’s effort to
selectively apply vague, gene ral laws against particular defendants, or
even in the trumping up of charges when no such laws can be used.
This leads to a familiar dilemma. If judges relax process when
they think that a defendant is a public threat, governments may take
advantage of this opportunity and bring charges against partisan
opponents. Eventually, the public, including the mainstream
opposition, will realize that process protections have been relaxed,
and the government will lose its credibility. If people believe that the
government targets its political opponents by persuading judges that
they are public threats, they will—on the theory I have advanced—
withdraw their support from the government. They would likely
withdraw their trust from the judiciary as well.
Several design features of the judiciary mitigate this tension. I
divide them into two categories: selection of judges and incentives of
judges. I then discuss how judges relax process.
Selection of judges. In the United States, virtually every judge is a
member of one of the two major political parties and is selected on
the basis of two criteria: competence and proved partisan loyalty. In
most other advanced countries, judges are members of the
government bureaucracy but are trained and treated as experts,
rather than partisans.
The American system functions properly as long as the parties
alternate in power or government is occasionally divided, so that
judicial appointments are, individually or in the aggregate, the
product of compromise between the two parties.106 As most judges

106. Cf. Ramseyer, supra note 63, at 728–30; Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil
Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59,
63–64, 83–86 (2003) (arguing that roughly equally matched parties in a competitive party system
will tolerate an independent judiciary so that they are protected from persecution when out of
power).
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are the product of the patronage system, they will refuse to allow the
other party in power to convict me mbers of their own party on
trumped-up charges. To be sure, frequently a (say) Republican
government will be able to bring a case before a Republican judge,
but there is always the chance that the appellate panel will be
dominated by Democrats, who will be sure to draw attention to
partisan elements in the trial if there are any. By contrast, neither a
Republican nor a Democratic judge will have much sympathy for a
radical who seeks to destroy the constitutional system under which
the judge exercises power. Thus, any judge is more likely to relax the
rules of process in such cases.
The selection system in foreign countries is not quite as effective.
Judges are trained as technocrats, and therefore they are more likely
than their American counterparts to apply process rules in a
mechanical fashion, regardless of the political views of the
defendant.107 This may explain why legislatures in some of these
countries—especially Germany —are more likely to pass laws that
prohibit extreme political dissent inconsistent with the constitutional
underpinnings of the state.
Incentives of judges. Civil law systems make up for the weak
selection mechanism of judges with more powerful incentives to
comply with government policy. Judges are bureaucrats, and although
they have some civil service protections, they are vulnerable to
sanctions meted out by the government. In Japan, for example, judges
who displease the government may find themselves assigned to
remote rural districts.108 To avoid such sanctions, judges may be
willing to relax process rules when the defendant is a public threat.
But why would such judges not also permit convictions of partisan
opponents? The answer is likely that the judges fear that the
mainstream opposition party of today will be the party in power
tomorrow, armed with the power to exile the judge to remote districts
or show their displeasure in other ways. The alternation of parties
maintains an incentive that enables the prosecution of people whom
both parties dislike —genuine public threats—but prevents the

107. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1971, 1994–95
(2004).
108. See Ramseyer, supra note 63, at 727–28 (“[J]udges who decided politically se nsitive
cases according to non-LDP political preferences incurred a substantial risk that the Secretariat
would assign them to a series of low-status positions.”).
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prosecution of people whom only one party dislikes—members of
another mainstream party.
By contrast, it is harder for the American gov ernment to punish
judges who fail to relax process in trials of public threats. Federal
judges have independence under the Constitution that, as a practical
matter, makes punishment impossible. Still, the government can
reward compliant judges by elevating them. Indeed, the judges in the
Rosenberg and Dennis cases were elevated to the court of appeals.109
Judge Hand, who ruled against the government in an Espionage Act
case during World War I, was subsequently denied elevation to the
court of appeals that may have been his due.110
As a practical matter, then, the American and foreign systems
may have the same effect. They either select judges or give them
incentives such that process rules are likely to be maintained for trials
of mainstream partisan political opponents, but not for trials of public
threats or of people with fringe views. Judges might expect to be
rewarded when they conduct trials that convict those widely regarded
as public threats—either with popular acclaim, elevation, or similar
benefits. In the first week after the Dennis case concluded, the
presiding judge received fifty thousand letters from grateful citizens,
many urging him to run for office.111 And, of course, judges may share
the public’s fear of public threats, and, for that reason, be willing to
relax process rules to convict them.
How judges relax process. How do judges relax process without
destroying the rule of law as a device for maintaining political peace
between mainstream groups? The primary answer has been that
judges relax process mainly during wartime and other emergencies.112
In doing so, they ensure that political competition will occur during
normal times, at which time judges will enforce process protections.
They also seem to relax process when the defendant is a political
extremist.

109. Irving Kaufman, who presided over the Rosenberg case, and Harold Medina, who
presided over the Dennis case, were both elevated to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Both
judges were highly regarded before these cases, so it is quite possible that they would have been
elevated anyway.
110. See STONE, supra note 4, at 169–70. His elevation was delayed several years. Other
judges who acted similarly were attacked in the press and ostracized. Id.
111. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 113.
112. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN . L. R EV.
605, 644 (2003).
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As noted above, judges learned from the Sedition Act
prosecutions of President John Adams’ administration the dangers of
trying mainstream political opponents. Since then, there have been no
American political trials of mainstream political opponents. All
subsequent political trials have targeted extremists—Communists,
anarchists, Nazis, KKK members, me mbers of Islamic fundamentalist
groups. When the government prosecutes extremists, the public is not
as likely to assume that the government is trying to obtain partisan
advantage—these extremists are just too weak and unpopular to be a
political threat to the mainstream parties, and they are feared because
of their tendency toward violence—except, of course, when the
prosecution takes advantage of public fears or misunderstandings for
political gain (though this is no different from ordinary prosecutions
for political gain).
This is not to say that trials of extremists have been
uncontroversial. The public’s political views fall along a spectrum,
and trials against extremists alarm people who hold views between
the extremes and the mainstream. But the point is that American
judges have allowed these trials to proceed, and doing so has been
politically possible and even advantageous.
Indeed, some judges have enthusiastically facilitated political
prosecutions. The Federalist judges in the Sedition Act cases
instructed juries in such a way that shifted much of the burden of
proof onto the defendants.113 Most judges in Espionage Act cases
during World War I read the statute broadly, so that the government
would not need to provide evidence that the defendant’s statement
caused a direct harm such as obstruction of military recruitment.114
The judge in the Haymarket case allowed the bailiff to stack the jury
with middle-class, mostly native-born citizens hostile to the anarchist,
working-class, foreign-born defendants, and he gave the prosecution
much more latitude than the defense.115 The judge in the Chicago 8
case jailed many of the defendants and their lawyers for contempt,
errors that were reversed on appeal.116 The judge in the LeRoi Jones

113. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 4, at 325–27 (“[T]he presiding judge relieved the jury of
even [the duty of deciding on intent] by flatly stating that bad intent had been proved.”).
114. PETERSON & FITE, supra note 4, at 17.
115. See AVRICH, supra note 10, at 263–67.
116. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 78.
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case made clear, by his questioning and demeanor, that he believed
that Jones was guilty.117
An abiding concern for judges is that if they identify too closely
with the government, they will lose their reputation for impartiality. If
they are not considered impartial, they will both lose much of their
public support and also the support of the government itself, which
can benefit from judges who constrain it somewhat, rather than too
much or too little.
For this reason, judges encourage governments to create
specialized courts that are not operated by regular (Article III)
judges. Military courts and commissions are examples; these tribunals
do not eschew process altogether but do reduce it.118 Military judges
and lawyers are loyal to the military, but they are expected to act with
some independence and can be trusted to keep secrets.119 Allowing
the government to use the military does not protect partisan
opponents, but it does preserve the integrity of the judiciary (except
to the extent that permitting military trials undermines it), so that it
can credibly reassert its impartiality as between the mainstream
parties when the emergency ends.
The main example is the Civil War, when military rule enabled
authorities in the North to prosecute people who expressed political
sympathy with the Confederacy. These trials sometimes led to
significant political disturbances in the Union and President Lincoln,
who was more politically sophisticated than the generals to whom he
had to delegate military rule, was not happy with them.120 However,
to avoid the obstructionist efforts of mainstream judges like Justice
Taney,121 Lincoln had to rely on military rule and accept its attendant
risks.
Similar factors have been at work in the Bush administration’s
creation of military commissions to try al Qaeda members and
Taliban soldiers. The establishment of these commissions has
117. See Dolbeare & Grossman, supra note 98, at 232–34 (“At the end of the trial [the
judge] charged the jury so as to leave no doubt of his belief that Jones was a liar and a
scoundrel . . . .”).
118. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648–49 (2004).
119. For the Supreme Court’s views of the tra de-offs involved, see Johnson v. Eise ntrager,
339 U.S. 763, 778–80 (1950), which upheld the conviction by military tribunal of nonresident
enemy aliens.
120. See R ANDALL , supra note 10, at 179 & n.16.
121. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). See generally Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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apparently not hurt the government politically 122 because the
American public appears to believe that emergency conditions justify
a relaxation of due process.123 Moreover, at the present time, it is not
plausible to think that these commissions are being used against
mainstream partisan opponents.
D. The Jury
Scholars today usually think of juries as fact-gathering
institutions. Because jurors bring diverse experiences and
expectations to the trial, they can combine their perspectives,
enabling them to sift evidence more effectively than even a highly
experienced judge. The assumption that juries are necessary for
accuracy has stimulated a large literature that investigates the extent
to which jurors really do make correct decisions about guilt and
innocence. Although this literature has not reached firm conclusions,
evidence suggests that cognitive biases and social influences may
cause jurors to make worse decisions than judges do.124
This scholarly focus has obscured another function of juries,
which is not so much to contribute to the accuracy of the factgathering process as to present a barrier against government
oppression with judicial complicity. The jury’s entrenchment in
American jurisprudence is due to its pre-Revolution popularity, when
jury nullification derailed prosecutions of revolutionaries and other
critics of the British gov ernment. The judges, who owed their position
to British authorities, took the side of the prosecution and were
frustrated by the recalcitrant juries. This history implanted in the
American mind the conviction that juries, not judges, are the bulwark
against political prosecutions.125
122. Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry did not make an issue of them during the
2004 presidential election campaign.
123. Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, July 26–27, 2005, in War on Terrorism,
POLLINGR EPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm (last viewed Oct. 1, 2005)
(noting 65 percent of respondents favored “protecting [their] safety and surroundings from
terrorism” over “protecting [their] civil liberties”); Pew Research Center for the People & the
Press Survey, July 13–17, 2005, in War on Terrorism, supra (tracking the margin by which
respondents’ concern that the government “[had] not gone far enough to adequately protect the
country” outweighed their concern that it “[had] gone too far in restricting the average person’s
civil liberties”).
124. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES : HOW JURIES DECIDE 79–95,
245–48 (2003); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex-Post ? Ex Ante: Determining Liberty
in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995).
125. See Amar, supra note 4, at 1150–51.
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The history suggests that the jury could be an ideal device for
permitting political prosecutions against public threats but preventing
those against partisan opponents. After the American Revolution, the
jury could no longer regard the government as presumptively a
hostile force. And if the government can make a plausible case that a
particular defendant poses a public threat, the jury may be willing to
convict even though the legal basis of the conviction is weak. In
addition, as long as the jury is politically diverse—in the sense of
having at least one or two members who belong to, or sympathize
with, the opposition party—the unanimity rule ensures that partisan
convictions will not be possible. To be sure, extremists who find their
way onto juries may be able to block the conviction of a public threat,
but judges and lawyers are careful to prevent such people from being
assigned to the jury. Thus, as a general matter, juries ought to be able
to hinder partisan prosecutions, but not prosecutions of public
threats.
American history provides only ambiguous evidence for this
hypothesis. Juries’ propensity to return convictions does not appear
to depend on whether the defendant belonged to an extremist or
mainstream group. Thus, although it is true that Wobblies, members
of the Communist Party, and foreign spies have been routinely
convicted,126 juries also returned convictions almost without exception
under the Sedition Act of 1798, which targeted mainstream
opponents of the government.127 Juries did not interfere with Sedition
Act prosecutions because jurors were selected by political appointees
such as marshals,128 and many of the judges instructed the juries in an
aggressive fashion. 129 However, jury manipulation became a political
issue that was exploited by the Republicans;130 the fear of jury
nullification may explain why there were not more trials in the
Republican-dominated South. 131

126. But not always: trials of some prominent radicals during World War I under the
Espionage Act resulted in a hung jury. See STONE, supra note 4, at 170 & n.*. Some Vietnamera trials also ended in acquittals or hung juries. Id. at 483.
127. See SMITH, supra note 4 passim. For one exception, see id. at 282.
128. Id. at 423; see, e.g., id. at 235–36, 321, 348 (identifying the role that political divisions
played in the trials of Lyon, Cooper, and Callendar).
129. See id. at 325–27.
130. See id. at 321, 348.
131. Id. at 187. The preponderance of trials in northern and middle states was due to the
greater influence of Federalists in those areas. Id. at 177.
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The best evidence for the hypothesis that juries could block
political convictions comes from the Civil War. With the suspension
of habeas corpus and military rule, political opponents could be tried
without a jury or, for that matter, without an independent judge. It
seems clear that the reason that Lincoln and then Congress
suspended habeas corpus was that they expected juries to acquit
Southern sympathizers and others who were conspiring to impede
troop movements or engage in sabotage but who had not committed a
provable crime.132
The costs and visibility of manipulating juries to ensure
conviction may prove too high for many governments. The more
mainstream the political opponent, the more difficult it is to
manipulate the jury—because it is more likely that a member of the
opponent’s party will end up on the jury unless manipulation takes
place. And even if manipulation is successful, it may be blatant and
thus good fodder for the defense. The right to a jury may in fact have
resulted in fewer partisan trials than otherwise would have occurred.
E. The Defense Lawyer
Good legal process grants criminal defendants the right to
competent and independent defense counsel. Competence is a
straightforward requirement; independence is more complex.
Defense lawyers are officers of the court, and they are not permitted
to help the defendant engage in pe rjury. But, even if paid by the
government, they are, as a matter of custom, law, and professional
self-understanding, antagonistic to the prosecution, to the point that
obtaining an acquittal of a guilty client may seem a positive duty and
a badge of honor. And, of course, defense lawyers attract clients by
obtaining acquittals.
When the defendant is a public threat, the independence of the
defense counsel may create problems. At one extreme, defense
lawyers may belong to groups that share the goals of the defendant. If
so, revealing classified information to defense lawyers becomes an
unacceptable risk for the government. Even allowing defense lawyers
to have private contact with defendants may pose unacceptable risks
because defense lawyers may carry messages between defendants and

132. See Farber, supra note 8, at 16–18; Frank L. Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials
and Ex Parte Milligan, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, supra note 10, at 97, 101–03.
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their organizations.133 Even a defense lawyer who does not share the
defendant’s goals may inadvertently reveal sensitive information.
At the other extreme, the defense lawyer’s good-faith zeal on
behalf of a client may hinder the prosecution of a public threat.
Defense lawyers demand process; if the government relaxes process,
the defense lawyer will draw attention to the government’s efforts,
causing public embarrassment, and perhaps will persuade the jury to
acquit. All of this may be tolerable, but it is far from ideal.
Denying the defendant a lawyer is hardly a solution, as it
encourages the public to think that the defendant is being tried for
partisan reasons.
Various intermediate mechanisms have been developed. First,
the weakest constraint is to require defense lawyers to abjure any
connection with, or sympathy for, extremist groups. In the United
States, this constraint arose in a decentralized way when bar
associations decided that their members could not belong to the
Communist Party.134
Second, governments may replace civilian defense lawyers with
military lawyers. This requires either a suspension of habeas corpus,
as in the Civil War, or else classifying the defendant as an enemy
combatant.135 Military procedure does not usually dispense with
lawyers, but these lawyers are soldiers and therefore can be assumed
to be more loyal to the state than ordinary defense lawyers.
Third, governments can give more or less assistance to lawyers;
more or less access to their clients; and so forth. In some of the enemy
combatant cases arising from the prosecution of the war on terror, the
defendants were initially denied access to a lawyer, and then given
limited access under supervision.136
To the extent that defense lawyers feel loyalty to the
government, or have internalized norms of judicial process—such that
they will attack the prosecutor but not the system—they may have
limited value for the political defendant. The American Communist

133. See Julia Preston, Lawyer Is Guilty of Aiding Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1
(describing the conviction for providing material aid to a terrorist of a lawyer who represented
an al Qaeda member).
134. See K IRCHHEIMER, supra note 19, at 253–54 (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S.
252 (1957)); see also Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1951).
135. It remains unclear whether defendants must be given civilian lawyers. See generally
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
136. Neil A. Lewis, Sudden Shift on Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A1.

02_POSNER.DOC

2005]

2/6/2006 4:01 PM

POLITICAL TRIALS

127

Party instructed its members not to use lawyers, or to limit them to
the technical aspects of the case, and trained its members to use the
courtroom as a platform for espousing their opposition to capitalism.
The goal was not to persuade the jury to acquit the defendants—
though that would be welcome—but to persuade workers that the
capitalist justice system could not do justice.137
F. Publicity
Political trials are often, but not always, public. Publicity serves
the cause of the government when it believes that the defendant is a
public threat and that the public, persuaded by the prosecution that
the defendant is dangerous, will forgive any bending of the rule of law
and feel gratitude to the government for protecting it.
But publicity also protects the defendant, who can use the trial as
a platform to denounce the government. The Chicago 8 trial is the
best example of this phenomenon in recent memory,138 but there have
been many other trials in which the government dropped or settled
charges after the political danger of the trial became clear, or
pardoned or granted clemency to the defendants. Eugene Debs’s
stature rose after his conviction for sedition during World War I. He
received almost one million votes for president while in jail, and
subsequently his sentence was commuted by President Warren
Harding.139
If publicity can protect the political opponent, it can also
endanger the prosecution of the public threat. Many political trials
have prosecuted accused spies, such as Ethel and Julius Rosenberg
and Alger Hiss, and in conducting such trials, the government does
not want to reveal secret information to the world. The usual practice
is to keep relatively low-level trials secret when doing so is permitted
by law; proceedings of military tribunals may be kept secret, for
example. But, this creates the risk that the public will infer that the
defendants are not public threats but political rivals of the
government.

137. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 13–15 (discussing the activities of the International Labor
Defense).
138. See Danelski, supra note 105, at 164.
139. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 97–98. Harding also commuted the
sentences of Abrams and his codefendants, but this was part of a bargain in return for which the
defendants exiled themselves from the United States. RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING
FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 336–38 (1987).
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Political trials are often farcical, and, for many, this shows that
they are a bad idea. At the Chicago 8 trial, two of the defendants,
Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, appeared in court one day wearing
judicial robes, and then took them off and wiped their feet on them.140
At the Dilling trial, defense lawyers repetitiously lodged identical
objections on behalf of each of the defendants to delay the trial and
frustrate the judge.141 But the elements of farce are the result of the
specific strategy of the defendant to risk everything to make the
government back down, rather than working within the legal process
in the hope of gaining a regular acquittal or reduced sentence. In
some cases, like the Chicago 8 trial, the farce worked in favor of the
defendants, who managed to convince large segments of the public
that the justice system or the government was unjust.142 But, in other
cases, like the Dennis case, the farce left the public unmoved, the
strategy failed, and the movement petered out.143 As messy as these
trials were, it is far from clear that they were failures, from the
perspective of the government.
G. Summary
In political trials, the government and the defendant battle for
public opinion. The government seeks to persuade the public that the
defendant is a public threat rather than a mere political opponent. If
this is true, the government’s best strategy is to publicize the trial and
give the defendant ample time to make a political defense (for
example, “Justice is not possible without a proletarian/Islamic
revolution.”) Any defects in process may be forgiven by the judge,
jury, and public, who are glad to see the threat extinguished.
Sophisticated defendants in cases like these, however, will
downplay their revolutionary ardor and draw attention to the defects
in process. If, for example, the government relies on a general law,
the defendant will point out that the government could use the law
against mainstream political opponents as well as radicals or
extremists. If the judge or some jurors belong to the out-of-power
party, they may be persuaded to acquit to protect the mselves and
their party. Moderates in the public may become suspicious that the

140.
141.
142.
143.

Danelski, supra note 105, at 164.
BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 40.
Danelski, supra note 105, at 177–80.
BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 168.
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government is establishing a precedent with the extremists before
turning its attention to mainstream political opponents. If so, they
may put political pressure on the government to drop the charges.
The government, then, has the task of persuading the judge, jury,
and public that the relaxation of process (or the enforcement of
explicit laws against political dissent) is limited to cases involving
authentic public threats. This can be done by limiting the law or
enforcement action to aliens, people with connections to enemy
foreign countries or movements, people with connections to groups
that engage in violence, and people with highly sensitive positions
(soldiers, spies, government employees), and by granting as much
process as is compatible with the requirements of secrecy. As I have
argued, allowing political defenses may also be useful.
Complicating matters for the government, the logistical
difficulties of running an ordinary criminal trial become political
problems in a political trial. The everyday compromises of a normal
criminal trial—the judge and prosecutor’s influence over the
composition of the jury; reliance on secret evidence or testimony
when victims or informers face retaliation; the need to cut off
defendants, witnesses, and lawyers in the interest of time; the
exclusion of morally relevant but legally irrelevant arguments; the
blunders of subpar lawyers and judges—take on heightened
significance at a political trial, in which a skeptical public may
misinterpret these normal compromises as a special effort by the
government to deprive the defendant of what the public thinks are
the standard protections. When the public is suspicious enough about
the government’s motives, the government might be well advised to
give the defendant heightened process and focus on convicting the
defendant for violations of normal laws (if any) rather than making
vague “dangerousness” the focus of the trial.
The amount of process granted in a trial is a function of all the
factors that I have discussed—the independence of the judge, the
availability of defense lawyers, the extent of the right to make a case
and cross-examine, and so forth. It is not clear whether each element
is essential or whether granting more of one element can compensate
for less of another; this is perhaps true in some cases but not others.
Each factor is context specific. It may be necessary to deny an
articulate and charismatic defendant the amount of time available for
testimony that is given to a regular defendant. Publicity and even
lawyers may have to be dispensed with when the evidence consists of
secret materials; in this case, a judge from an out-of-power party may
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nonetheless serve to constrain the government appropriately. Again,
an independent judiciary may be unavailable when it is tainted—a
common problem for trials in transitional regimes—and a dependent
judge will be used; but then other protections (defense lawyers, for
example) may compensate for the subservient judge.
IV. VARIATIONS ON THE POLITICAL TRIAL
This Part examines trials that are variations on the type of
political trial that I have discussed so far. Trials of enemy combatants
are an even purer form of the politically colored domestic criminal
trial: their main purpose is identifying people who are threats but who
have not committed crimes. Transitional trials are efforts to eliminate
the influence of politically dangerous people left over from an earlier
regime. Pedagogical trials are trials whose purpose is to educate the
public. And international trials are politically colored because
international law is very weak and, in its practical application, is
heavily influenced by the geopolitical agendas of powerful states.
A. Trials of Enemy Combatants
Nations have traditionally detained captured soldiers for the
duration of hostilities and tried and punished those enemy soldiers
who committed war crimes. These trials have elements of both
political trials and ordinary trials. On the one hand, enemy soldiers
tried for war crimes are usually granted the same process that one’s
own soldiers are granted, and the laws of war are generally accepted
by nations.144 On the other hand, prosecutions of soldiers reflect
military and political goals. Immunity is granted to enemy soldiers
with intelligence value, technical expertise, managerial skills, and
other characteristics that are important to some new war effort or to
the return to peace. For example, the U.S. granted immunity to
Japanese researchers who had conducted experiments on prisoners of
war (POWs), a price deemed worth paying for the information they
had to offer.145 Moreover, the armies rarely prosecuted their own
soldiers for war crimes.

144. These principles are required by the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War pt. I, art. III, § 1(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
145. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 465
(1999).
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The laws of war extend their protection only to soldiers who
meet certain qualifications. They must wear uniforms, carry their
weapons openly, belong to a regularly constituted military unit, and
meet related criteria.146 Soldiers who violate these rules are
considered spies, guerillas, or, in the current phrase, “unlawful
combatants,” and deprived of the rights enjoyed by POWs. Shortly
after its entry into World War II, the American military set up a
military commission to try German soldiers—including one American
citizen—who had sneaked onto American territory to engage in
sabotage.147 This type of military commission need not comply with
the requirements of the Geneva Convention—for example, it may
grant less process than the tribunals used for POWs who commit
crimes. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has
claimed the right to classify Americans and foreigners as unlawful
combatants and to detain them until the end of hostilities.148 The
government also has established military commissions that have the
authority to try enemy combatants—members of al Qaeda and
affiliates—for war crimes.149
The U.S. government’s post-9/11 legal strategy has received a
great deal of criticism. Many critics argue that al Qaeda terrorists
should be treated as criminal suspects and, when captured, given the
same process as regular criminal defendants.150 Although the courts
have not gone this far, they have demanded that the government
grant unlawful combatants more process than the government was
initially willing to give them. 151 The debate, within the courts and
outside them, has weighed the unfairness of denying process against
the demands of military exigency.152

146. See Hague Convention (II) on Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Geneva Convention (III), supra note 144, at pt. I, art. IV, 75
U.N.S.T. 138.
147. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942).
148. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715–17 (2004).
149. It is not yet clear whether this plan will be acceptable to courts; for an argument that
the commissions are constitutional, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2 D 249 (2002). See also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640–42 (2004).
150. E.g., Peter Spiro, Not War, Crimes, FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY, Sept. 19, 2001,
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20010919_spiro.html.
151. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648; Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004).
152. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 69, at 181–87; David Luban, The War on
Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 4, at
219, 221–23.
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The theory that I have advanced sheds light on this debate, albeit
from a different angle. One question—why the post-9/11 strategy
reflects a military rather than law enforcement approach, when
similar actions during earlier wars were undertaken mainly by law
enforcement—can be easily answered.
First, the public believes that the threat posed by al Qaeda is
enormous; for that reason, it will tolerate a reduction of political
competition to enable the government to counter the threat. By
contrast, the public has had more mixed views about the threats
posed by domestic Communists, anarchists, and members of other
fringe movements. World War I and the Vietnam War had less public
support than the war on terror because America’s enemies did not
pose as palpable a threat.
Second, members of al Qaeda are, for the most part, ethnically
and religiously distinct from Americans. As long as the government
focuses its investigative efforts on Arabs, Muslims, and aliens from
Arab and Muslim countries, and the American public believes that
the government’s attention is confined to these types of people, the
vast majority of the public itself will feel unthreatened by politically
motivated prosecutions. By contrast, World War I–era prosecutions
often targeted ordinary Americans, especially those affiliated with the
labor movement, which enjoyed widespread support.
In these two ways, the closest precedent for the effort against al
Qaeda is the internment of Japanese Americans during World War
II. Both cases involve high and palpable risks to American civilians
on American territory; and both cases involve an unassimilated,
ethnically distinct, and politically weak group, which could be
targeted for special measures without creating the risk that such
measures would be used against mainstream Americans.153
Third, the war against terror is a bipartisan effort. The
government cannot credibly accuse the opposition party—the
Democrats—of being supporters of al Qaeda, so the government
cannot plausibly classify Democrats as enemy combatants. The
current situation bears no resemblance to the Sedition Act
prosecutions, which were brought by Federalists who believed that

153. However, the use of military commissions has received more criticism after September
11 than during World War II. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and
Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 274, 280–89
(2002) (arguing that the difference in reactions is due to greater suspicion of government,
greater respect for civil rights, and the lesser magnitude of the threat).
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the Republicans had allied themselves with France, then America’s
enemy in an undeclared war.154 Nor does it resemble the Cold War,
when Republicans could castigate the Democrats for being soft on
Communism but never tried to bring criminal charges against
mainstream Democratic opponents.
All of this suggests that reduced process protections during the
war against terror do not provide the Bush administration with real
opportunities for targeting political opponents; thus, few people
regard the trials and detentions as motivated by partisan political
objectives. To be sure, these trials and detentions may be mistaken,
unfair, opportunistic, and political in the sense of being designed to
show the public that the government is doing something when it
really is not doing much. But this does not distinguish them from
ordinary law enforcement practices. As long as al Qaeda and similar
groups pose a genuine public threat, and as long as these groups are
unable to acquire significant support from mainstream Americans,
the reduction in process protections tolerated by the courts so far can
be explained using the instrumental theory of liberal legalism.
B. Transitional Trials
Transitional trials occur when a newly democratic state tries
officials of the old regime for acts that were lawful at the time they
were performed. The transitional government faces a delicate
problem. It must, on the one hand, satisfy demands for substantive
justice against the old regime and eliminate the influence of remnants
that continue to hold important positions in the military, bureaucracy,
and economy. On the other hand, the transitional government must
avoid the accusation that it is using transitional trials to do what the
old regime did: eliminate political opponents through a perversion of
the judicial process. Transitional governments have balanced these
considerations in several ways.
First, the government may rely on the exceptional nature of the
transition and the crimes of the members of the old regime. Their
chief crime (in a moral sense) was the rejection of liberal legality;
they are being punished, in part, for that offense. The public watching
the trial need not infer that ordinary individuals will be similarly
denied due process once the transition has been completed and the
regime has entered the phase of normal politics. Retroactivity, in a
154.

See supra text accompanying notes 64–65.
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paradoxical way, reduces concerns of political motivation by
indicating that younger people untainted by the past have nothing to
fear from the courts.
Second, the government may grant the defendant as much
process as is compatible with the retroactive nature of the trial. This is
not trivial and may include the assignment of a lawyer, the chance to
testify and cross-examine, publicity, and so forth. A government bent
on eliminating its political opponents would not give defendants these
rights.155 The lesson is that the government may, and should, exercise
restraint when pursuing its political opponents. This may seem like a
modest lesson, but it is an important one for states emerging from
decades of totalitarianism.
Third, governments may rely heavily on legal fictions to conceal
the political motivation of the prosecutions. I will say more about this
tactic in Section C.
Finally, some governments may use administrative proceedings
rather than trials. In Czechoslovakia, for example, administrative
proceedings were used to identify and “lustrate” former officials and
collaborators, who were deprived of positions in the government but
could otherwise resume a normal life.156 These proceedings reduced
both process and punishment. The government thus could not take
advantage of the limited process in these proceedings to eliminate its
political opponents but could only embarrass them; the
embarrassment was, in any case, connected to the source of the
transitional government’s legitimacy—the decisive public rejection of
the old regime.
C. Pedagogical Trials
Much discussion of political trials concerns a second-order issue:
the educational message that they send to the public. Uncomfortable
with the notion that a trial could ever be justified by public demands
for retributive justice or the dangers posed by a public threat, scholars
have instead focused on how political trials may teach the public
liberal values. Four examples will illustrate this argument.
First, Professor Jon Elster and other scholars argue that
transitional trials may be justified as a way to educate the public

155. For instance, Stalin’s regime did not do so. See CONQUEST, supra note 73, at 92
(discussing trials during Stalin’s rule in which sentences were set before the trials even began).
156. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 767.
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about the rule of law.157 Observers of the transitions feared that
liberal democracy would not take hold in societies in which the rule of
law had been repudiated for decades. By conducting fair trials of
members of the old regime, transitional trials would dramatically
show that the rule of law extends even to enemies of the new
government.
Second, Professor Shklar argues that the Nuremberg trial was
justified as a device for creating new norms of international
illegality.158 Prior to that trial, international law did not prohibit
genocide and other crimes against humanity; the trial helped
established that this behavior was criminal.159 In doing so, the
Nuremberg trial helped extend international law beyond its
traditional application to states and into the realm of human rights.
Third, several scholars have pointed out that the Nuremberg trial
placed “on the record” thousands of archival documents that showed
how the Nazis engineered the Holocaust.160 Truth is a liberal virtue,
and documenting atrocities is thus a liberal duty. This argument was
used by those who supported the establishment of the tribunals
charged with trying perpetrators of international crimes in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.161
Fourth, many domestic political trials have been intended to
teach the public about emerging threats. The trials of Jeffersonian
Republicans were intended to show that the defendants were in
league with America’s enemy, France.162 The trials of Nazi
sympathizers and Communists were intended to show Americans that

157. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 37, at 29; Jon Elster, Moral Dilemmas of Transitional
Justice, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: N EW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Peter Baumann & Monika
Betzler eds., 2002). Professor Walzer makes an analogous argument about the executions of
Charles I and Louis XVI. He claims that democracy could not be established until the
subservient habits that evolved in a monarchy were eliminated; to him, the symbolism of the
trials was of great significance. See WALZER, supra note 10, at 86–89.
158. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 170–79.
159. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 31–47 (2002).
160. See, e.g., LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2001) (arguing that these trials can successfully
reconcile the demands of legal process and of history).
161. This is emphasized by OSIEL, supra note 37, at 53–55, who argues that political trials in
transitional settings are important for shaping the collective memory of past atrocities.
162. SMITH, supra note 4, at 14.
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the Nazis, then the Communists, posed a threat to American
security.163
The educational purpose of political trials is different from, but
not necessarily inconsistent with, their main purpose, which is to
counter public threats or to do substantive justice. However, in
practice, the main purpose of the trials takes precedence and obscures
their educational impact. As several critics have noted, the
transitional trials might be interpreted not as a vindication or even
illustration of the rule of law, but as the opposite: as demonstrations
that judicial process and the rule of law can be disregarded when the
defendants are political opponents.164 After all, these trials resulted in
the conviction of people for activities that did not violate any law at
the time that they occurred. This apparent dilemma has also bothered
critics of international war crimes trials, who fear that the educational
purposes of these trials may corrupt the judicial process.165
The criticism is too simple, but it does have an element of truth.
Transitiona l trials are meant to show, in part, that the old regimes’
great sin was their disregard of liberal legalism; not to punish
members of the old regime would also send the wrong message, as it
would indicate that tyrants are not punished for their tyranny. The
lesson of the transitional trials is that, if political opposition may be
tolerable within the constraints of a liberal constitutional order, the
rejection of liberal democracy is never tolerable.
This message has not, however, been delivered in the most
candid way. Rather than forthrightly announcing that certain political
beliefs and systems would not be tolerated, the governments have
surrounded the judicial proceedings with legal fictions. The fictions
implied that the defendants were being tried and punished for
committing crimes recognized as such during the old regime.
In the trials of East German border guards, for example, many
jurists claimed, and some judges held, that the conviction could be
based on prior law—including international treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),

163. See POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY , supra note 10, at 204–28 (discussing the
blacklisting of the Hollywood 10 for their refusals to cooperate with the House Committee on
Un-American Activities); id. at 271–7 4 (describing an indictment charging that individuals
joined “the Nazi movement to destroy democracy throughout the world” ).
164. See the discussion and citations in Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 762–65.
165. See ARENDT, supra note 4, at 135 (“He did his duty . . . he not only obeyed orders, he
also obeyed the law.”).
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international jus cogens norms against human rights violations, West
German law (on the theory that East German law was never valid
because East Germany never had sovereignty), natural law, and East
German law that on its face could be interpreted as prohibiting the
border killings.166 These were all subterfuges: the ICCPR and jus
cogens norms were never thought to apply to domestic prosecutions
like the border guard cases, and East German law, whose
preunification domestic validity was acknowledged by West Germany
in the unification treaty, authorized the border guards to kill people
who were trying to escape.167 Academics who recognize the force of
retroactive justice in the transitional setting nonetheless find the lack
of candor intolerable. Let the governments prosecute the remnants of
the old regime for the misery it inflicted, says Professor Elster, but
make them admit what they are doing.168 Hannah Arendt anticipated
this reaction with nearly identical comments about the Eichmann
trial: don’t pretend that Eichmann broke the law; admit that the
motivation for the trial was revenge.169
These criticisms reflect the worry that the trials will not educate
people if they send muddy or mixed messages. But one can see why it
is unwise to use political trials for educational purposes by asking why
the German government and courts did not follow Elster’s
recommendation. Surely, the government’s main concern was
obtaining convictions—both to appease longstanding outrage in West
Germany at the actions of the border guards and to show East
Germans that such behavior would no longer be tolerated. The judges
appeared to have seen the force of these goals, but their jobs were to
enforce the law, not implement official policy. It is hard to imagine
them candidly announcing that they would imprison the border
guards even though they broke no laws. The educational goal of the
trials ran up against the bureaucratic realities of a modern liberal
state.
The same problem exists for the goal of creating a historical
record. One purpose of the Nuremberg trial was to provide a record
166. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 793–95; see Kif Augustine Adams, What Is Just?:
The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German Border Guards, 29
STAN. J. INT’L L. 271, 295–300 (1993).
167. A. JAMES MCADAMS, JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED GERMANY 31–34 (2001).
168. See Elster, supra note 157, at 308–09; Hart, supra note 37, at 619–20.
169. See ARENDT, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“What we have demanded in these trials, where
the [defendant] ha[s] committed ‘legal’ crimes, is that human beings be capable of telling right
from wrong.”).
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of the Holocaust.170 The extensive German documentation of the
concentration and death camps could be entered into the record of
the tria l; films of the atroc ities were also shown.171 The French
referred to their trial of Klaus Barbie as a “pedagogical trial” because
its purpose was to teach the public about French complicity in the
Holocaust.172
But as the Nuremberg trial shows, the efforts to provide a record
of history conflicted time and again with the more important goal of
proving the charges. The Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutors sought
representatives of important segments of the population to stand as
defendants. The German and Japanese publics needed to learn that
the rot had spread throughout the military, the bureaucracy, and the
industrial elite. A trial of four army generals would not have been as
effective as a trial of one general, one admiral, one diplomat, and one
industrialist. At Nuremberg, Justice Jackson sought to implicate
German industry; but, when a natural choice—Adolf Krupps—turned
out to be too ill to stand trial, Justice Jackson’s demand that his son
Gustav be substituted outraged the judges, and they refused.173 In
Japan, the prosecutors made sure to charge not only representatives
of each component of the Japanese government, but also to find
defendants to represent each time period—the attack on Manchuria
as well as the attack on Pearl Harbor—although government officials
during the various periods were not the same.174 These choices all
contributed to a satisfying narrative arc, but they also made the
government vulnerable to the argument that the trial was intended
for propaganda, not to establish the truth.
Nuremberg illustrates other compromises. Because the trial had
to be conducted with dispatch, many atrocities were not discussed: the
records had not yet been discovered. 175 Because the prosecutors relied
on documentation rather than witnesses, undocumented but amply
witnessed events were also downplayed. Most important, each victor
state had different preferences about which events to emphasize and

170. Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 179
(1947).
171. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 101.
172. DOUGLAS, supra note 160, at 185–86.
173. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 138–39.
174. Solis Horwitz, The Tokyo Trial, 28 INT’L CONCILIATION 473, 495–97 (1950).
175. CONOT, supra note 1, at 87–88 (1983); see also MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE
N UREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945–46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 193 (1997).
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which to suppress.176 For the Russians, the goal was to show the world
the extent of the sacrifice of the Russian people, and to conceal
Russian atrocities and Russian aggression against Poland and other
innocent states. This was not the aim of the Americans, who
preferred to emphasize the guilt of German leaders for waging
aggressive war. A similar problem arose over the charge that the
German invasion of Norway was part of its conspiracy to engage in
aggressive war; the Nazis responded that they had merely preempted
a British and French invasion of Norway—which was true, and
embarrassing to the British, who refused to release secret documents
that would have confirmed the defendants’ claim.177 Events that
placed the victors in a bad light were suppressed as much as possible.
Indeed, even though everyone suspected the Russians, the indictment
charged that the Germans had massacred the Polish officers at Katyn
Forest.178 As is always the case in trials, the establishment of the truth,
in all its nuance and complexity, was subordinated to the immediate
goals of proving or refuting the charges.179
Even when the truth comes out, it does not necessarily follow
that the right lessons will be learned. The Allies initially hoped that
the Nuremberg trial would teach the Germans and their own
populations that the German leaders were evil and that there was no
possible justification for their behavior. The dual goals were the
education of the Germans about their own leadership, so that they
could reconcile themselves to a new order in which Germany would
either be ruled by foreign powers or else have greatly reduced
international status, and vindication of the political leadership of the
Allied countries.180
Throughout the trial, the prosecutors and judges feared that the
defendants would argue that (1) the war crimes committed by the

176. See, e.g., TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 104–07.
177. MARRUS, supra note 175, at 138–39.
178. Id. at 56–57. The Soviets subsequently presented witnesses testifying as to German
responsibility for the massacre, but when they tried to prevent the Germans from providing
their own witnesses, their motion was refused by the tribunal. Id. at 100–01.
179. For another example taken from the Klaus Barbie trial, see DOUGLAS, supra note 160,
at 189, who discusses the way that the requirements of legal form caused prosecutors to
downplay the most serious aspects of Barbie’s crimes. Osiel provides further examples from the
Barbie, Nuremberg, Eichmann, and Argentine junta trials. See generally OSIEL, supra note 37,
at 79–141.
180. MINEAR , supra note 10, at 13–14 (discussing Justice Jackson’s statements at the
London Conference where the Nuremberg charter was drafted).
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Nazis were matched by war crimes committed by the Allies; and (2)
Germany’s behavior was justified by the Versailles Treaty and was
abetted during the 1930s by the British and the French, who ratified
many of the formal violations of the Versailles Treaty by the
Germans, and by Russia, which cooperated with Germany in many
ways.181 Although not many citizens of Allied nations would have
been receptive to these arguments, German citizens might have been;
thus, the trial, like the Versailles Treaty itself, could have become a
rallying point for unreconstructed Nazis and nationalists in Germany.
Although the defendants did make these arguments, they did not
have the expected effect. The Germans at first ignored the trial,
regarding it as irrelevant or as an exercise in Allied propaganda. But
then something surprising happened: the German people began to
feel that they were themselves on trial. The trial made clear the vast
participation of ordinary citizens in the Nazi extermination machine,
even though “[t]hat had never been Jackson’s intention. He, like
many others, had hoped to prune out Nazism and induce healthy
growth in remaining Germany. The idea of Ge rman guilt had not
appeared in the indictment. It had emerged during the trial.”182
But a guilty nation was not a nation that could rejoin the world
community as a liberal democracy. If there was something wrong with
Germans, how could they be given political responsibility? The
notion of German guilt grew particularly difficult for the Americans
as it became clear, partway through the trial and to the premature
delight of the defendants, that the Germans would be America’s allies
in the gathering Cold War against the Soviet Union.183 Polling data
suggest that the Germans initially thought that the trial was fair, but
changed their minds after a few years; by the 1950s, the dominant
view was that the trials were unfair and the convictions were victor’s
justice.184
181. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 260, 304.
182. Id. at 223.
183. Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, was the turning point. See id. at
201.
184. PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY : THE OMGUS SURVEYS, 1945–1949, at 93,
121, 138 (Anna J. Merritt & Richard L. Merritt eds., 1970); PUBLIC OPINION IN
SEMISOVEREIGN GERMANY : THE HICOG SURVEYS, 1949–1955, at 101 (Anna J. Merritt &
Richard L. Merritt eds., 1980); see also RICHARD L. MERRITT, DEMOCRACY IMPOSED: U.S.
OCCUPATION POLICY AND THE GERMAN PUBLIC, 1945–49, at 160–73 (1995). The trials did not
have measurable impact on American public opinion. See WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON
N UREMBERG: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-CRIME TRIALS
87–116 (1970).
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The Tokyo war crimes tribunal had the opposite but equally
unwelcome effect. The Japanese did not consider themselves on trial,
or guilty, though they were horrified when they learned about the
atrocities committed by their soldiers. But as bad as their soldiers
were, they did not seem any worse than the Americans, who had
killed hundreds of thousands of civilians through firebombing and
atomic bombing. The trial gave the defendants an opportunity to
defend Japan’s militarism, an opportunity seized by Marshal Tojo
with great success.185 Tojo argued that Japan had acted in self-defense
against colonial aggression. “Only victor nations sat on the Bench,
many of them colonial powers with far longer records of imperia lism
than Japan—and they allowed the colonies they were intent on
regaining no place among the judges.”186 The trial suggested the
moral equivalence of the victors and vanquished with respect to
aggression, but the victors had a monopoly on hypocrisy.
A great problem for the Tokyo trials was the decision by the
U.S., made prior to the initiation of the trial, to allow the Japanese
emperor to retain his throne. As a result, he could not be tried, even
though he was the one person who had formal—and probably
personal—responsibility for all aspects of Japan’s aggression. 187
Trying to tie together disparate defendants in a conspiracy when the
one person they had in common was absent was a nearly impossible
task.188 The U.S. had its reasons for immunizing the emperor:
American officials believed that a cooperative emperor was their best
hope for governing Japan. In Tokyo, as at Nuremberg, the need to
cooperate with defeated officials and leaders warred with the desire
to do justice, and the result was a message with little educational
value, at least little that would directly serve the interests of the U.S.
The trial was widely regarded as a political failure.189 Many Japanese
citizens did not see the trial as a vindication of the rule of law but as
victor’s justice. The trial contributed to a resurgence of nationalism
during the postwar years.190
185. MEIRION HARRIES & SUSIE HARRIES, SHEATHING THE SWORD: THE
DEMILITARIZATION OF JAPAN 163 (1987).
186. Id. at 175; see also DOWER, supra note 145, at 471.
187. See HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 581–612
(2000) (describing Emperor Hirohito’s role and the efforts to conceal it during the trial).
188. DOWER, supra note 145, at 459–60.
189. HARRIES & HARRIES, supra note 185, at 175–76; see also OSIEL, supra note 37, at 181
n.43 (citing sources recognizing the trial’s failure to “take[] root among the Japanese people”).
190. DOWER, supra note 145, at 444.
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However, nationalism did not reassert itself in all quarters, and
one historian argues that the trial—because it was a caricature of
justice—contributed to postwar Japanese pacifism. “[T]he crimes
revealed by the trial, compounded by the perception that this was a
world gone mad with violence and that such crimes against peace and
humanity were not unique to Japan, reinforced the deep aversion to
militarization and war that had come with defeat.”191 If this was the
lesson that the Japanese drew from the trial, it certainly was not the
lesson intended by the Americans, who sought to remilitarize Japan
as an ally against the Soviet Union and who not only abandoned
further war crimes prosecutions after the Tokyo trial was over, but (as
in Germany) cooperated with and supported war criminals, including
a future prime minister who the U.S. thought could be useful in the
Cold War.192 Political trials may have an educational function, but this
function is often out of the hands of those who conduct them.
The educational performance of political trials thus has a sorry
history. Whether or not they result in convictions, they never teach
exactly the kind of lesson that the government has in mind. The
question, then, is why a government might be willing to undergo the
risk of a trial to educate the public: why not send educative messages
through propaganda, official statements, and other routine channels?
Or, if the government does want to discover and publicize the truth
about historical events, why not use truth commissions?193
One answer is that the government believes that it can win a
public political contest with its enemies. In such cases, the trial
becomes a forum, like a legislative house, in which a policy debate is
engaged. The value of the message is heightened if the defendant has
a fair chance to refute it but fails to win over the public—especially
when life or freedom are at stake, making the defendant a natural
object of sympathy. To be sure, the government cannot present its
message in as unadulterated a form as a propaganda message, but the
message of the trial, because of the presence of the defendant, is more
credible.

191. Id. at 474; see also BIX, supra note 187, at 612–18 (describing the complex reactions of
the Japanese public). For a general discussion of Japanese attitudes about the Tokyo trial, along
with a comparison to German attitudes about the Nuremberg trial, see IAN BURUMA, THE
WAGES OF GUILT 159–68 (1994).
192. DOWER, supra note 145, at 525–26.
193. For a survey of truth commissions, see generally TRUTH COMMISSIONS : A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT (Harvard Law School Human Rights Program ed., 1997).
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This argument is similar to the instrumental theory that political
trials occur because governments need to maintain their credibility—
they serve the public interest and do not merely eliminate partisan
opponents—when attempting to counter public threats. In the current
argument, the defendant is not necessarily a real threat, but the
defendant’s message is. The government gives the defendant the
chance to publicize political views because the government believes
that the public will reject them.
The latter argument helps to explain why international political
trials are almost always promoted and conducted by liberal
democracies—which might seem paradoxical, given the rarity of
domestic political trials in liberal democracies and their frequency in
authoritarian states. The explanation is that the liberal democratic
system has greater international appeal than any particular
authoritarian system, because authoritarian systems always elevate
the interests of some national or religious or ideological group;
democratic systems are, in principle, universalistic. Every
international political trial has been intended as a story about how an
authoritarian government led its people astray, and, by implication,
about how liberal democracies are superior. The creators and
managers of trials are not always correct; sometimes, a trial does not
convince anyone of anything. But the greater appeal of trials to
democratic governments is easily unde rstood.194
D. International Criminal Trials
1. General Considerations. The international criminal trial195 is
a special type of political trial. The “defendant” is now a soldier or
former leader of a (usually) defeated state; the prosecuting
“government” is now a foreign power, or a coalition of foreign
powers, which vanquished the other state. The victor’s main goal is to

194. Professor Gary Bass, by contrast, argues that international trials occur because of the
power of the legalist ideal. Leaders of liberal democracies seek to impose liberal values on
defeated countries; the trial suggests itself as one way to advance this goal. See BASS, supra note
13, at 8. There are two problems with Bass’s argument. First, the story breaks down at the
domestic level: both ordinary authoritarian governments and democratic governments rely on
courts. Second, international criminal trials from Nuremberg on do not reflect the legalist idea
because they do not conform to the rule of law. They are attempts to impose liberalism, not
legalism, on other countries.
195. I use this term to refer to trials of leaders and other major actors; for trials of ordinary
soldiers and civilians, see supra Part IV.A.
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eliminate the hostile government of the defeated state—its leaders
and its supporters. The purpose of the trial is to define the category of
individual, government, or state behavior that will not be tolerated by
the victors, so that the rest of the world will understand what kind of
behavior will provoke an international military response and what
kind of behavior will not.
The Nuremberg trial, for example, was an ambitious effort to
define new rules of international conduct that would make a
repetition of the two world wars impossible. The world wars were
blamed in part on great power rivalries and the understanding that
states were permitted to go to war for political objectives. Thus, one
of the Nuremberg charges was the crime of aggressive war.196 And the
conduct of World War II, with the German government’s mass
slaughter of its own citizens as well as foreign citizens, led to the
invention of “crimes against humanity.”197 These two crimes, and the
notion that individuals (as opposed to states) could be charged for
violating them, were all innovations.198 Ideally, if individuals in the
future knew that they could be punished for the crimes of aggressive
war, crimes against humanity, and also ordinary war crimes (also a
subject of the Nuremberg trial, but not an innovation), they would be
deterred from starting wars or conducting them too brutally.
The Nuremberg trial had many of the elements of domestic
political trial. The victorious governments, led by the United States,
sought to accomplish two things. First, they wanted to eliminate the
major Nazi figures. This could have been accomplished with summary
execution—an option that was widely discussed and seriously
considered. But there was a second goal as well. This was to show the
world—including the citizens of Germany, the citizens of the
victorious nations, and the governments of other countries—that
there would be a new international order, one in which governments
would not be permitted to engage in aggressive war (that is, use

196. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 328.
197. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 162–63.
198. Prosecutors claimed that the Kellogg-Briand Pact could provide the basis for the crime
of aggressive war, but that agreement was not understood to create legal obligations, and
certainly not criminal law applying to individuals. In any event, the Kellogg-Briand pact was a
dead letter. The effort to create a crime of aggressive war continues today. The Rome Statute
creating the International Criminal Court provides for further negotiation over the definition of
such a crime, because states parties could not reach agreement. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 5(2), July 1, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.

02_POSNER.DOC

2005]

2/6/2006 4:01 PM

POLITICAL TRIALS

145

military force to disturb the status quo), commit war crimes, and
commit atrocities against their own citizens (such as genocide). The
penalty for violation would be criminal prosecution. The flip side of
this aggressive stance was that nations that did not do any of these
things had nothing to fear from the United States and the Soviet
Union, or from any other major power. Or, to shoehorn this analysis
into the earlier categories, legitimate international political
competition could no longer involve aggressive war or crimes against
humanity.
The advantages of holding international criminal trials following
the conclusion of World War II can now be seen. The trials would
show that the victorious powers were not interested in eliminating
any person who happened to be a threat to their international
ambitions, nor even in exercising the traditional victor’s prerogative
of taking revenge. The victorious powers sought to punish only those
who had, through their actions, endorsed the view that aggressive
war, genocide, and similar actions were legitimate forms of
international action. To persuade the world of their good faith, the
victorious powers had to give the defendants an opportunity to be
heard, to show that they had not engaged in the actions that, under
the new order, would be considered crimes. Otherwise, the world
would have no reason to believe that the victors sought to create a
new international order that involved some self-restraint on their own
ambitions.
This was the ideal, but the managers of the trial ran into trouble
from the beginning. None of the victors had acted consistently with
the new rules that they were now pressing on the Germans, so the
world might understandably react with skepticism to the victors’
claims that the rules were sustainable. Russia had engaged in
aggressive war against Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states; the
United States had dealt with its own internal racial problems with
highly oppressive laws that could be likened to crimes against
humanity; and all sides had committed atrocities in their conduct of
the war. Within limits, the charges could be qualified; the Americans,
for example, insisted that an element of the crime against humanity
was that the atrocities occurred in a wartime setting, so as to avoid the
charge that America’s racial laws were crimes against humanity. The
defendants could, and did, try to make an issue of these
inconsistencies; they could, and were, shushed by the courts (the
London charter banned the “tu quoque” defense); but the fact
remains that the rest of the world knew about the inconsistencies. The
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problem was not so much one of victor’s justice, but a more basic
problem about world order. If the states that were pressing for new
norms of international conduct had never complied with them, what
reason was there to think that they could be sustainable?
At roughly the same time, the managers of the Tokyo trial were
running into similar problems. The goals of this trial were the same as
the goals of the Nuremberg trial: to eliminate powerful and influential
people in the Japanese government, and to show that their
elimination was tied to their violation to new norms of international
legality, which would provide the basis for a peaceful world order.
The problem was, again, that the United States as well as Japan had
committed war crimes, and although Japan had clearly brought war to
the United States, the roots of this war could be traced to a
competition between two great powers for colonial influence in the
west Pacific. No clear norms differentiated the conduct of the United
States and Japan—Japan had Nanking, the United States had
Hiroshima. These points were made by one of the dissenters, Justice
Pal.199 For Pal and other critics such as Professor Shklar, the
difference between Nuremberg and Tokyo was that the Germans
engaged in mass extermination of their own citizens; the Japanese did
not (though they did kill thousands of foreign citizens).200
The literature considers Nuremberg a success and Tokyo a
failure. One might doubt this judgment and conclude that both were
failures. As noted in Section C, neither trial had clear, beneficial
effects on public opinion; neither trial established much of a
precedent. International criminal trials would not be used again for
almost fifty years. In contrast to domestic political trials, we might
infer that international political trials are unlikely to succeed because
there is no international consensus on the line between legitimate
(international) political competition and illegitimate international
political competition. A consensus of states was not willing to accept
the premise, for example, that a great power should not start a war to
protect access to resources, as Japan did.
If Nuremberg and Tokyo were failures, or if Nuremberg alone
was a success because of the uniquely evil behavior of the Nazis, it
can be readily understood why subsequent international criminal
trials have been rare and not particularly successful. The problem has

199.
200.

See DOWER, supra note 145, at 471–72.
Id.; see SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 188–90.
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always been that the U.S. and other states have been complicit in the
reign of the defeated leader or that they have been unable to obtain a
complete surrender. Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan
Milosevic —these are people whom the U.S. at one time or another
dealt with as legitimate leaders.201 Thus, the claim that they should be
prosecuted for engaging in illegitimate behavior rings hollow. The
judges have tried to deflect charges of bias by granting defendants an
extremely high level of process, with the result that the trials drag on
for years while the defendants use their trials as platforms for stirring
up resentment and xenophobia at home.202 But no amount of process
can overcome the fundamental problem of bias, which has nothing to
do with the procedures, but rather with the bare fact that the trials are
used by strong nations to assert their international ambitions at the
expense of weak nations.
2. The International Criminal Court. If only the strongest states
have the power to establish international tribunals, determine their
memberships, set their agendas, and thus influence the development
of international criminal law, predictably the resulting norms of
international criminal law will reflect the interests of the strong states,
not the weak ones. Thus, at Nuremberg, crimes against humanity
were tied to war to immunize the United States from claims that its
racial policies violated international criminal law. But weaker states
could hardly be expected to submit to such an international order,
and their efforts to gain influence have resulted in the establishment
of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The ICC has an independent prosecutor and tribunal, and
jurisdiction over international crimes committed by nationals of states
parties and over international crimes committed on the territory of
states parties.203 In theory, the ICC pr osecutor decides on
prosecutions in the same impartial way that ordinary prosecutors are

201. See, e.g., The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice
or Show of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Rel., 107th Cong. 107–71 (2002)
(statement of Larry A. Hammond, Attorney at Law, Osborn Maledon, P.A.) (indicating that
the U.S. provided assistance to the Croatian offensive against Serbia and may have been
complicit in Croatian war crimes).
202. These problems were discussed by witnesses before a House hearing on U.N. criminal
tribunals. See id. See generally Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials:
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111 (2002); Meernik, supra note 10.
203. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, 13(b), July 1, 2002, available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.
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supposed to: on the basis of the seriousness of the crimes and the
amount of resources available. What would this mean? Prosecutors
would need to make the case that the crimes that they investigate are
more serious than the crimes that they do not investigate; judges
would need to persuade the world that convictions and sentences flow
impartially from the extremely vague rules of law.
This structure avoids the obvious forms of victor’s justice, but it
introduces its own set of problems. On the one hand, because the
U.N. Security Council no longer chooses which crises will be subject
to investigation and prosecution,204 and because ICC members can no
longer immunize the mselves from prosecution, defendants cannot
argue that the ICC is a tool of the great powers to suppress weak
states they do not like. On the other hand, the ICC prosecutor and
judges are human beings with their own national origins and biases,
eager to satisfy whichever governments determine whether they
retain their positions or obtain new ones. International politics still
determines who is prosecuted and tried, which means that defendants
can argue that their trials are politically motivated.
One might argue that the new politics of international criminal
adjudication under the ICC will reflect something like a global
consensus on international crime, rather than the views of the United
States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and a few other members of
the Security Council. Defendants before the ICC will thus be arguing
against the world, not a few great powers, and the claim of political
motivation will be weaker. However, this benefit is purchased at a
high price. Because the great powers no longer see themselves as
having dominant influence over the development of international
criminal law under the ICC, they have no reason to support it.205
Thus, the main military and economic powers—predominantly the
U.S., but also Russia and China206 —have made it clear that they will
have nothing to do with the ICC, and the U.S. has gone to great
lengths to undermine it.207 Deprived both of the political support of
204. It does have referral power, however, and only an extremely weak power to defer
investigations. See id. arts. 13(b), 16.
205. For a discussion of these problems, see Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating
International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI . L. R EV. 89, 93–101 (2003).
206. A list of states parties can be found at International Criminal Court: The States Parties
to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
207. The U.S. has compelled numerous countries to agree not to refer Americans to the
ICC. HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH, BILATERAL IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS 7–13 & tbl.1 (2003),
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf.
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the most powerful countries and the military means that these
countries supply, the ICC is a frail institution with a dim future.
International criminal trials, then, are analogous to domestic
trials in a divided state. When the public is sufficiently divided, all
trials will look like efforts by the government to eliminate its political
opponents rather than like vindications of community norms
incorporated in the law. In the international setting, international
criminal tribunals will similarly look like efforts by the governments
that influence the prosecutor and judges—whether the Security
Council (in ad hoc cases) or the members of the ICC—to harass or
embarrass states with contrary foreign policy objectives. The states
whose nationals are being tried will always make this charge, however
faithfully the prosecutor and judges try to carry out their duties.
This charge will be hard to deflect, not only because it is difficult
to prove to the world that it is hard to convict a criminal who has not
been tried, but also because one’s judgment of the seriousness of a
crime is unavoidably political. Suppose, for example, that leaders in a
war of national liberation are responsible for the deaths of thousands
of civilians who have been inadequately separated from the
battlefield, whereas the authoritarian government on the other side
has killed only a few hundred. Are the revolutionaries’ crimes more
serious because more extensive or less serious because in the pursuit
of a good cause? Would it matter if the rest of the world sided with
the authoritarian government, or with the rebels; or what if the rest of
the world is split between them?
The American experience with domestic political trials is
instructive. Domestic political trials can be politically successful only
when they target extremists who can plausibly be considered
threats—in the long or short term—to American political institutions
and mainstream values. When domestic political trials are used
against mainstream political opponents, as during the Federalist
period, they contribute to political division rather than overcome it.
The Nazis committed extraordinary atrocities, threatened all of the
world’s major powers, and were thoroughly defeated; in these unique
circumstances, there was enough international political consensus
about the undesirability of the Nazi system to make an international
trial possible —albeit one that was heavily controlled and quite
controversial. Every other international trial has been a political
failure—or, at least, cannot claim visible evidence of political
success—either because it has introduced further divisiveness into an
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arena in which consensus was absent, or because such divisions
prevented it from accomplishing its goal.
CONCLUSION
Political trials owe their uneasy status in liberal democracies to
their paradoxical role, which is to eliminate enemies of a system
devoted to political tolerance. In a political trial, the normal
constraints of liberal legalism yield, with judicial and public
acquiescence, to the political imperative of self-preservation; this
relaxation also creates an opportunity for the government to stifle
legitimate political competition. Why do governments, then, not
conduct political trials more often? The reason is that people
understand that political trials can be used for partisan purposes, and
a government that conducts political trials takes the risk that the
public, or a large portion of it, will withdraw its support. For this
reason, governments in liberal democracies conduct political trials
only when they can plausibly claim a national emergency, and the
public tolerates and approves of such trials only when it believes that
the national emergency justifies giving the government powers that it
can that it can potentially misuse for partisan gain. Governments can
further enhance their political support, however, by granting what
one might call “political process” to the defendants in political
trials—the power to make a political defense of their activities.
Whether the trial is conducted for partisan gain or public safety itself
becomes an issue in the trial, and by allowing this issue to be
addressed, the government shows that it believes that its policies
enjoy the support of the public and that the defendant’s views do not.
The political trial is a high-stakes exercise. If the government
persuades the public that the defendant or the defendant’s views pose
a threat to the nation, then its legitimacy will be enhanced, and the
threat will be removed. If it does not, then it may lose public support
and provoke a constitutional crisis.
If this view is correct, it is too simple to criticize a political trial
on the grounds that the defendant is being punished for particular
political beliefs, or that the judge has unfairly relaxed normal process
protections. The problem with this criticism is that sometimes
departure from ordinary due process is justified. Due process
standards have evolved to address normal criminal activity and do not
reflect the special circumstances of an emergency or other crisis.
Consider the contemporary example of the Guantánamo Bay military
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commissions. It is not appropriate to critic ize them on the ground that
they do not provide detainees with the process enjoyed by ordinary
criminal defendants under domestic law or even with the level of
process enjoyed by enemy soldiers who are tried for committing war
crimes. The special circumstances created by the threat of further
terrorism by al Qaeda call for special procedures that are tailored to
that threat.
I cannot provide a complete analysis of the problem here, but a
few observations may be useful. Relaxed procedures are justified by
the magnitude of the threat and the importance of secrecy. At what
point should process be set, then? It seems to me that the answer is
mainly one of international politics: to the extent that foreign states
object that their citizens are being convicted for crimes without
adequate process, the U.S. will need to take these objections seriously
(which it has). There are also moral limits on what a government can
properly do to an alien (or its own citizens) in the course of protecting
itself, but if international law reflects the standard, these limits are
minimal.208 Judicial involvement should be limited because there is no
reason to think that the executive will not make the proper trade -offs;
at least, there is no more reason to think so than in any other life-anddeath foreign policy decision that judges refrain from reviewing. So
far, it is clear that the Bush administration is not using military
commissions to target legitimate political opponents.
In the case of domestic (including transitional) political trials, the
real issue is whether the government makes a plausible case that the
defendant—alone, as part of a group, or as a symbol for a certain
message—poses a genuine threat to public safety or the constitutional
system. If not, it is reasonable to object to the trial on the ground that
the government is using the judicial process to eliminate legitimate,
even if extreme, political opponents. But what makes the question
difficult in any case is that the government will have legitimate
reasons not to disclose all its evidence and can point to heightened
security risks that justify public and judicial deference to its claims. In
the case of international political trials, the real issue is whether the

208. The laws of war prohibit states from targeting enemy civilians, but states may kill them
as incidental to lawful targeting of enemy soldiers and facilities, as long as civilian casualties are
not “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) pt. IV, art. 51, §§ 1, 5(b), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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defendants or their worldview pose a threat to the international
order, or at least are likely to make it worse rather than better. On
this view, the conventional wisdom about Nuremberg is incorrect. It
was not justified because it created new norms of international crime;
those norms could have been created, without a trial, via treaty.
Indeed, they were, in part. It was justified because, or to the extent
that, it persuaded people around the world to abandon fascism and
embrace liberal democracy (if in fact it did do this).
The role of judges in both the domestic and international cases is,
to a large extent, political. In the domestic cases, judges will not
always know whether a prosecution is a regular criminal action or a
political action, but they will have their suspicions. When they believe
that the prosecution is political but are unsure whether the defendant
is a public threat or not, they often can—and perhaps ought to—relax
legal process and demand political process. Relaxing legal process
may include broadly interpreting statutes, permitting selectiv e
prosecution or retroactive lawmaking, limiting the choice of defense
lawyer, preventing the defendant from seeing classified evidence, or
acquiescing in military trials. Granting political process includes,
chiefly, allowing the defendant to mount a political defense—
typically, that the government’s motives are partisan and the judicial
system is corrupt. As the decorum of the judicial forum yields to the
circuslike atmosphere of democratic politics, many people will
condemn the trial as a farce. But allowing politics into the courtroom
may be preferable to the stark alternatives: preventing the
government from countering genuine public threats or allowing the
government to eliminate its political opponents under cover of
judicial process.

